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introduction
The UL,' BBB,2 NASD, 3 and ABA4 are regulators of the market-
place, but they are not part of the familiar "alphabet soup"5 agencies of
the government. They are private agencies. Like their public counter-
parts, they make laws and adjudicate disputes.6 Some of these private
agencies operate as formal governmental deputies. Others are autono-
mous, but have formal connections with government. Still others have
no connection whatsoever with government.' Private regulation has ad-
vantages for both government and the public,' prompting calls for more
extensive use of private sector regulation. 9 But, as Justice Brennan re-
1. 'UL" stands for Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. For a general description of its ac-
tivities, see infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
2. "BBB" stands for Better Business Bureau. For a general description of its activities,
see infra notes 26-30, 58-61 and accompanying text.
3. "NASD" stands for National Association of Security Dealers. The NASD is a pri-
vate, not-for-profit organization that was registered with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in 1939. The NASD has power, delegated by Congress, to license and discipline
security dealers. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3 to 78s (1983).
4. "ABA" stands for American Bar Association. For a general description of its activi-
ties, see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
5. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286 n.4 (1979) C'he term 'alphabet soup'
gained currency in the early days of the New Deal as a description of the proliferation of new
[government] agencies ").
6. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3(16) (1987) (The Administrative Conference of the
United States recommends that "Agencies should review the areas that they regulate to deter-
mine the potential for the establishment and use of dispute resolution mechanisms by private
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cently reminded us, "[While] [t]he Government is free... to 'privatize'
some functions it would otherwise perform... such privatization ought
not automatically release those who perform government functions from
constitutional obligation."' This Article examines the constitutional
and public policy implications of the activities of the private regulators
that comprise a growing and substantial "Fifth Branch" of
government. 1
The debate over privatization of governmental activities 12 tends to
focus on the privatization of specific governmental services 13 such as gar-
bage collection 4 and public transportation. 5 In contrast, this Article
organizations as an alternative to direct agency action."); E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING
BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS ch. 8 (1982) (series of
recommendations on how to increase the amount of private regulation).
10. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct.
2971, 2993 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting, Marshall, J., joining). See also West v. Atkins, 108
S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (1988) ("Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the state of its
constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody ... ").
11. This Article refers to private regulators as a "Fifth Branch" of government. "Fourth
Branch" is commonly used to refer to the administrative agencies created by Congress. See
infra note 56. The first, second, and third branches are, of course, legislative, executive, and
judicial. See U.S. CONsT. arts. I, II, III.
Fifth Branch has been used elsewhere to refer to other types of actors, including govern-
mental advisory committees, Advisory Committees, 1971: Hearings on S. 1637, S. 1964, and S.
2064 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971) (statement of Congressman John S.Monagan,
Chairman, Government Operations); a changing administrative branch consisting of policy-
makers in temporary positions with the Fourth Branch referring to a continuing administra-
tive branch, H. MERRY, FIVE BRANCH GOVERNMENT (1980); and interest groups, with
Fourth Branch referring to the press, C. PETERS & J. FALLOWS, THE SYSTEM: THE FIVE
BRANCHES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976). None of these usages are as common as the
use of Fourth Branch to refer to administrative agencies.
12. See generally AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EM-
PLOYEES AFL-CIO, PASSING THE BUCKS (1984); S. BUTLER, PRIVATIZING FEDERAL SPEND-
ING: A STRATEGY TO ELIMINATE THE DEFICIT (1985); W. KENNEDY & R. LEE, A
TAXPAYER SURVEY OF THE GRACE COMMISSION REPORT (1984) [hereinafter GRACE COM-
MISSION]; PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY ON COST CONTROL, A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1984); E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1982). For a relatively
early critique of privatization, see D. GUTTMAN & B. WILLIAMS, THE SHADOW GOVERN-
MENT: THE GOVERNMENT'S MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR GIVEAWAY OF ITS DECISION-MAK-
ING POWERS TO PRIVATE MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, "EXPERTS," AND THINK TANKS
(1976).
13. See, eg., GRACE COMMISSION, supra note 12, at ch. VIII, 92-94. The Commission
recommended that the following responsibilities be transferred to the private sector: (1) power
marketing administrations; (2) national space transportation systems; (3) V.A. hospitals and
nursing homes; (4) military commissary stores; (5) Metropolitan Washington Airports; (6)
federal vehicle fleet management; and (7) coast guard services.
14. S. BUTLER, supra note 12, at 40-41.
15. Perry & Babitsky, Comparative Performance in Urban Bus Transit: Assessing Priva-
tization Strategies, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57 (1986).
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focuses on the privatization of core governmental responsibilities-the
making of laws and the adjudication of disputes.
16
Part One of this Article examines the breadth of the activities of the
private regulators. Three categories of public-private relationships are
identified. These categories are used later in an analysis of constitutional
constraints on private regulators.17 Part Two compares the significant
characteristics of the Fifth Branch of government with those of the better
known "Fourth Branch," public regulators."8 Part Three examines four
basic constitutional doctrines that form the foundation of the Fifth
Branch.19 A five-step inquiry that should promote a more coherent con-
stitutional evaluation of the activities of the private regulators is pro-
posed in Part Four.2 °
I. Private Regulators as a Fifth Branch of Government
Private regulators make laws and adjudicate disputes in a broad
range of subject areas. Others have sorted private regulators into catego-
ries according to the subject matter of their work, such as land use or
professional standards.21 But this organization masks the underlying re-
16. "Core" governmental powers include at least those powers that the United States
Constitution vests explicitly in government. These powers include not only lawmaking, U.S.
CONST. art. I, and the adjudication of disputes, U.S. CONST. art. III, but also other specific
powers such as imposing taxes, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, declaring war, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 11, and making treaties, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Even though lawmaking and adjudication are considered core governmental powers, they
are not necessarily exclusively reserved for the government. See, eg., Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1978) (settlement of disputes not an exclusive public function);
infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
See generally Hanslowe, Regulation By Visible Public And Invisible Private Government,
40 TEx. L. REV. 88, 92 (1961) (an essential element of governmental power is the power to
coerce, which is "typically done by government through custom, decrees, rule and law"); Law-
rence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 648 (1986) ("certain powers
[are] essentially governmental, [such as] rulemaking, adjudication of rights, seizure of person
or property, licensing and taxation. These powers share the element of coercion, of making
someone do something he does not choose to do or preventing him from doing what he wishes
to do .... '"); Rudolph & Rudolph, The Limits of Judicial Review in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 63 NEB. L. REv. 84, 89 (1983) ("The first and most basic power that any society grants to
its government is the police power: the power to declare law, maintain order, and when neces-
sary, to suppress evils that threaten the public, as opposed to private, interests. A second
power that any society grants to its government is the authority to regulate relationships
among private individuals.")
17. See infra notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 53-123 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 123-261 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 262-326 and accompanying text.
21. For example, Louis Jaffee, in a landmark article, established five general categories:
(1) statewide referenda; (2) special districts; (3) restrictions on use of property; (4) professional
and industrial standards; and (5) administration of law and representation interests. Jaffe, Law
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lationship between the public and private sectors, and obscures the full
breadth of the Fifth Branch and the significant constitutional issues that
arise from its activities.
It may be advantageous to analyze private regulation in terms of the
types of relationships that arise between the Fifth Branch and the gov-
ernment. These relationships may be grouped into three categories: (A)
formal governmental deputizing of private regulators; (B) formal connec-
tion between government and private regulators; and (C) no formal con-
nection between government and private regulators. The use of these
categories ensures that the constitutional evaluation of private regulators
covers the full range of their activities. These categories also provide a
basis for focusing on the most constitutionally troublesome areas of pri-
vate regulation.
A. Category A: Formal Governmental Deputizing of Private Regulators
This category encompasses the least obvious cases of private regula-
tion: the private actors in this category have been formally deputized by
government as public regulators.22 As deputized governmental officials,
private citizens participate in the making of laws and the adjudication of
disputes. They are subject to public accountability statutes and constitu-
tional restrictions.23 Governmental deputizing of private citizens is com-
mon in the area of occupational licensing. In many states, professional
licensing boards are composed of full-time licensed practitioners who are
appointed to serve as part-time regulators. These boards are legally re-
sponsible for developing professional misconduct regulations and for ap-
plying the regulations in adjudicating disputes involving alleged
violations by licensed practitioners.24
Making By Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201, 221-34 (1937). George Liebman updated
and expanded Jaffe's scheme by adding another general category-resale price maintenance-
and developing ten sub-categories, including land use and professional standards. Liebman,
Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650 (1975); see also
Note, Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Parties, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 447, 450-54,
456 (1937).
22. If this category were construed broadly it would cover all public officials, because
every public official is in reality a private citizen who has been deputized as a public official for
the duration of the assignment. A broad definition would render this category meaningless
and would hide a significant and distinctive type of private sector involvement in the regulation
of the marketplace. Therefore, Category A is limited to private citizens who have been depu-
tized as public officials for limited purposes and for a limited number of days per year.
23. See infra notes 80-123 and accompanying text.
24. See generally S. GROSS, OF FoxEs AND HEN HousEs: LICENSING AND THE
HEALTH PROFESSIONS 97-105 (1984) (describing the compositions and functions of profes-
sional licensing boards).
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B. Category C: No Formal Connection Between Government and
Private Regulators
In direct opposition to Category A, this category covers the most
obvious cases of private regulation: the making of laws and the adjudica-
tion of disputes by strictly private agencies that have no formal connec-
tion with government. Private agencies in this category can wield great
regulatory power in the marketplace.2 5 Category C agencies include the
Better Business Bureau and Consumers Union, as well as many other
private consensual standards-setting organizations.
The Better Business Bureau (BBB) issues business standards and
mediates disputes between consumers and member businesses.26 The
BBB sets forth specific guidelines for fair and nondeceptive advertising,
27
an area also regulated by the Federal Trade Commission2 8 and many
local governmental consumer protection agencies.29 The BBB, funded by
its business members,3 0 operates independently of government.
Consumers Union (CU) evaluates a variety of retail products each
month and by doing so implicitly develops standards for judging the
products. Reports published monthly in Consumer Reports magazine de-
scribe the features of particular products and the results of CU's evalua-
tions in the form of a five-part, better-to-worse rating system.31 CU is
funded solely by the sale of publications and nonrestrictive, noncommer-
cial grants and fees.32
In addition to the BBB and CU, a large number of private consen-
sual standards-setting organizations have developed tens of thousands of
nongovernmental standards concerning "virtually every aspect of mod-
25. See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556, 570-71 (1982) ("ASME [a voluntary standards-setting organization] can be said to be 'in
reality an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of
interstate commerce." (citing Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
465 (1941))); see also infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
26. See COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., WHAT IS A BETTER BUSINESS
BUREAU? (rev. 1985); BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU OF METROPOLITAN NEW YORK; B. WAN-
SLEY, COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., HISTORY AND TRADITIONS OF THE
BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU (rev. 1983).
27. COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., CODE OF ADVERTISING (1985).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1983).
29. See generally CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON NEW CITY AND COUNTY CONSUMER
PROTECTION AGENCIES 30, 31, 34, 37, 45, 62, 66, 83, 87, 98 (1972).
30. See COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., WHAT IS A BETTER BUSINESS
BUREAU? (rev. 1985). But see infra note 284 and accompanying text.
31. For example, in its March 1987 issue of Consumer Reports, Consumers Union rated
17 features of 39 color television sets based on a five-part scale. A Guide to TVs: The Current
Choices in Screen Size, Features, and Sound, Plus Ratings of39 Sets, 52 CONSUMER REPORTS
142, 146-49 (March 1987).
32. See No-Commercialization Policy, 52 CONSUMER REPORTS 131 (March 1987).
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ern society."33 These private organizations adopt consensual standards
pursuant to procedures that only recently began to resemble procedural
due process.34 Voluntary health and safety standards are common, even
though such major governmental agencies as the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration and the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion also regulate the area." Funded primarily through dues and sales of
publications,36 Category C agencies are autonomous. But, as is discussed
in the next section, many large private consensual standards-setting orga-
nizations have developed formal connections with government.37
C. Category B: Formal Connection Between Government
and Private Regulators
This category includes organizations that have a formal relationship
with government, although the relationship is less definite than formal
deputization. Category B is a catchall category, encompassing relation-
ships that fall between Category A (deputization) and Category C (no
connection). Examples of Category B organizations include advisory
committees, rules-negotiation groups, arbitrators, and the issuers of pri-
vate voluntary standards. In each of these examples, the private sector
makes laws or adjudicates disputes, but the degree of governmental
power conferred, on the private sector varies from case to case, resulting
in many diverse public-private relationships.
Of the examples above, governmental use of advisory committees
involves the least delegation. Advisory committees provide governmen-
tal decision makers with input from private citizens and experts. 38 Un-
less otherwise authorized by statute or presidential directive, their power
is limited to giving advice: they do not have authority to dictate govern-
mental action.39 In reality, however, many advisory committees are in-
33. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1329, 1331 (1978). See also iL
at 1331-32, 1336-38.
34. Id at 1345-68.
35. Id at 1333.
36. Id. at 1338-41. Large Category C standards-setting organizations include the Ameri-
can Society for Testing and Materials, the National Fire Protection Association, the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, and Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
37. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
38. ,See Cardozo, The Federal Advisory Committee Act In Operation, 33 ADMIN. L. Rav.
1, 1-2, 31-46 (1981); Perritt & Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees And The PoliticalProcess."
The Federal Advisory Committee After Two Years, 63 GEo. L.J. 725, 726-29 (1975).
39. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2(a), 2(b)(6), 9(b) (1982).
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fluential in shapifng governmental policies.'
The development of rules through negotiation involves a greater de-
gree of private delegation than does governmental use of advisory com-
mittees. Rather than restricting their input to filing written comments,41
a group of interested public and private parties actually participates in
negotiations on a proposed regulation. The participants' role in lawmak-
ing is limited because any consensus the group reaches is technically only
a recommendation to the agency head.42 In practice, however, the
agency head is likely to give substantial deference to a recommendation4 3
for at least two reasons. First, if the agency head is faithful to the pro-
cess, she appoints a senior official to the negotiating team to represent the
interests of the agency and the public in the negotiations.' Second, if the
agency head does not give substantial deference to the consensus devel-
oped by the negotiating group, the parties are unlikely to commit their
time and resources to such a process in the future.45 As a practical mat-
ter, therefore, an agency head will probably approve a rule that has been
negotiated and recommended by the public and private parties. Under
these circumstances, the members of the negotiating team effectively act
as private lawmakers.
Another Category B regulator, the private standards-setting organi-
zation, wields great governmental power when public agencies issue reg-
ulations that incorporate private standards by reference.46 During the
40. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(Federal agencies "are notoriously under the control of lpowerful interests who manipulate
them through advisory committees.")
41. Under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, an agency usually promulgates a
rule by publishing notice of a proposed rule, receiving public comments, considering the com-
ments, and then promulgating a final rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
42. See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation Nos. 82-4
and 85-5), 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.82-4, 305.85-5 (1987) (recommendations of the Administrative
Conference of the United States). See generally Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for
Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Negotiating Regulations]; Harter, The Political
Legitimacy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 Am. U.L. REv. 471 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Political Legitimacy]; Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation
of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625
(1986); Susskind & McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J.
ON REG. 133 (1985).
43. Political Legitimacy, supra note 42, at 483-84.
44. See 1 C.F.R §§ 305.82-4(4)(g), 305.85-5(1) (1987); Negotiating Regulations, supra note
44, at 57-67; Political Legitimacy supra note 42, at 483-84.
45. See Political Legitimacy, supra note 42, at 484.
46. See American Soe'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolovel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
559 (1982). The American National Standards Institute, Inc., one of the largest standards--
setting organizations, estimates that 80% of its standards become mandatory. See Singer,
Who Will Set the Standards for Groups that Set Industry Product Standards?, 12 NAT'L J. 721
(1980); see also, Hamilton, supra note 33, at 1386-87.
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1970s, government agencies expanded their connections with these pri-
vate organizations by adopting voluntary standards, sometimes modify-
ing them and sometimes explicitly deferring to them instead of issuing
their own.47 Two federal agencies, the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission and the Office of Management and Budget, have tried to influ-
ence the procedures these private organizations use for developing
consensual standards.48
A final example of Category B regulation involves a rapidly ex-
panding area of private regulation: private arbitration compelled by a
court (also known as court-ordered arbitration or court-annexed arbitra-
tion). Compulsory arbitration confers an important governmental power
on private citizens: the power to adjudicate disputes. A growing number
of state and federal courts are implementing compulsory arbitration pro-
47. For example, when OSHA was established, its enabling statute provided that "the
Secretary shall, as soon as practicable... by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or
health standard any national consensus standard ... unless he determines that the promulga-
tion of such a standard would not result in improved safety or health." 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)
(1982), construed in American Fed'n of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 115-21 (3d Cir. 1975)
(statute created presumption in favor of adoption of national consensus standards).
The Consumer Product Safety Commission has issued a policy statement providing:
"The Commission may find that a mandatory standard is not necessary where an existing
voluntary standard appears to be reasonably adequate to eliminate or reduce the risk of injury
associated with the product.., and there is a sufficiently high degree of conformance to the
voluntary standard." Consumer Product Safety Commission, Commission Involvement in Vol-
untary Standards Activities, E(l), 42 Fed. Reg. 58,727 (1977).
The Office of Management and Budget has adopted this policy regarding federal procure-
ment: "Voluntary standards will be given preference over in-house standards in the absence of
mandatory Government Standards unless use of such voluntary standards would result in im-
paired functional performance, unnecessary cost... anticompetitive effects or other significant
disadvantages." Office of Management and Budget, Federal Participation in the Development
and Use of Voluntary Standards, 6(a)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. 4,327 (1980); see also 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.78-4(6)-(7) (1987) (Recommendation 7-4(6)(7) of the Administrative Conference of the
United States).
48. See Consumer Product Safety Commission, supra note 47, at D; Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, supra note 47, at 6(c). The two agencies conditioned the federal govern-
ment's participation in the development of consensual standards on whether the particular
private organization follows specific minimum "due process" procedures. However, a 1977
federal bill that would have subjected the voluntary standards groups to extensive federal regu-
lation failed to pass Congress. The bill proposed to give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
authority to establish procedures for private standards-setting organizations and would have
created a new agency to manage the voluntary standards program. Voluntary Standards and
Accreditation Act of 1977, S.825: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 537-73, (1977).
Moreover, in 1980, Congress also passed a law requiring the FTC to terminate a rulemak-
ing proceeding it had initiated to regulate private standards-setting organizations. 15 U.S.C. §
57a(i) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3, 5-6, 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1102, 1104, 1107, 1120.
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grams in. which private volunteers serve as arbitrators.4 9 Parties must
have their case heard and decided by a private arbitrator before the case
will be heard by a judge. The arbitrator's decision is usually not binding
and either party can seek a trial de novo.5 0 In theory, therefore, private-
sector participation in adjudicating disputes is very limited. But, in prac-
tice, arbitrators' power is significant because most parties to arbitration
do not take their cases to judicial trial .5  Therefore, most decisions of
private arbitrators are, in effect, final and binding.
Of the three categories, Category C presents the least complex pub-
lic-private relationships for constitutional analysis because Category C
regulation has, by definition, no formal connection with government.
Category A involves more complex public-private relationships because
formal deputization of private citizens disguises the private-sector in-
volvement in governmental regulation. Catchall Category B presents the
most complex public-private relationships for analysis because it encom-
passes a variety of relationships.52 Before examining the constitutional
issues raised by these three categories of private regulation, it is useful to
put the constitutional analysis in context by comparing key characteris-
tics of private regulators with the better known Fourth Branch of public
regulators.
II. Comparing Private Regulators with Public Regulators
The Fifth Branch of government is similar to the better known
Fourth Branch, comprising public regulators,53 in that both exercise core
49. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 225-32 (1985)
[hereinafter S. GOLDBERG]; Walker, Court-Ordered Arbitration Comes to North Carolina and
the Nation, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 901, 914 (1986).
50. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 49, at 225.
51. If most parties to arbitration did take their cases to judicial trials, then the primary
goals of arbitration-to divert cases from the courts, reduce costs, expedite dispute resolution,
and increase party satisfaction-would not be realized. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 49, at
226; Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 542-43 (1983) (less than
two percent of eases reached trial de novo in Eastern District of Pennsylvania); Walker, supra
note 49, at 916-17; see also Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts"
The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REv. 787, 807-12 (1983).
52. See infra notes 300-07, 316-25 and accompanying text.
53. "Fourth Branch" is commonly used to refer to the administrative agencies created by
Congress. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMIT=EE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, RE-
PORT OF THE COMMITTEE, WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT 39-42 (1937) (independent regulatory commissions are "headless 'fourth
branch' of the Government"); Strauss, The Place Of Agencies In Government: Separation Of
Powers And The Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 581-96 (1984) (independent regula-
tory agencies and executive agencies are part of Fourth Branch; historical distinctions are not
meaningful when agencies are examined from functional perspective). In this Article, regula-
tory administrative agencies are referred to as "public regulators."
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governmental powers and share similar histories and justifications. But a
crucial difference separates the two branches: public regulators are sub-
ject to extensive constitutional and statutory restrictions, whereas private
regulators are not. This is a difference of constitutional significance.
A. The Parallel Powers of Private and Public Regulators
Both public and private regulators make laws and adjudicate dis-
putes:54 both formulate rules to regulate future conduct, and both con-
sider evidence of past or present facts and render decisions in disputes.55
But while public regulators56 derive their powers from statutes,57 many
Category B and C private regulators derive their powers from nonlegal
sources. Consumers Union, the Better Business Bureau, and voluntary
standards-setting groups such as Underwriters Laboratories are purely
private Category C organizations58 that operate without statutory au-
thority to make laws and adjudicate disputes.
Lacking a legislative grant of power, Category C organizations nev-
ertheless have become influential regulators of the marketplace by build-
54. The basic difference between lawmaking and adjudication is reasonably clear. In a
case dealing with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, Justice Holmes drew the distinc-
tion in a way that is still useful today:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on pres-
ent or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and
end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing condi-
tions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act defines a "rule" as "the whole or a part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.. . ." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982). An "order," formulated in
an adjudication, is defined as "the whole or a part of a final disposition... of an agency in a
matter other than rulemaking but including licensing." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1982). These defini-
tions are not very helpful in characterizing hybrid activities like rate making, retroactive
rulemaking, and professional licensing. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,
§§ 7.1, 7.2 (2d ed. 1979); see also B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 4.1, 4.2 (2d ed.
1984).
55. For a description of the lawmaking and adjudicatory powers of several private regula-
tors such as licensing boards, the Better Business Bureau, Consumers Union, voluntary stan-
dards-setting organizations, advisory committees, negotiated rulemaking groups, and
compulsory arbitration programs, see supra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
56. Public regulators include early governmental agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission, see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982); New Deal agencies such as the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, see 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1982); and more recent creations such as the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 661, 655 (1982), and the
Environmental Protection Agency, see 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
57. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, §§ 1.5-1.6, § 4.3 at 151-52, §§ 8.1-9.27; Hanslowe,
supra note 16, at 92-93.
58. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
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ing outstanding professional reputations. Reputable members of the
business community typically conform their business practices to the
standards and decisions of these private regulators.5 9 Consumers have
also grown to rely on private agencies for information and protection in
the marketplace.' Thus despite important legal differences between the
powers of public regulators and private regulators, in practice the exer-
cise of these powers often affects the marketplace in a substantially simi-
lar manner.61
B. Parallel Histories of Private and Public Regulators
The Fourth Branch of public regulators and the Fifth Branch of
private regulators have developed in a parallel manner. The history of
public regulation' can be traced back to the first session of the First
Congress,63 whereas the modem development of public regulation began
with the establishment of the powerful Interstate Commerce Commission
59. See American Soc'y Of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
559 (1982) ('if a manufacturer's product cannot satisfy the applicable ASME code, it is at a
great disadvantage in the marketplace"); Singer, supra note 46, at 721 ("many retailers carry
only products that conform to [voluntary] standards"); see also Bluestone, When Consumer
Reports Talks, Buyers Listen-And So Do Companies, Bus. WK., June 8, 1987, at 135 ('Many
companies have made changes in their products after getting a bad rating from CU."). For a
description of the way these organizations set standards and issue decisions, see supra notes 25-
37 and accompanying text.
60. Consumers tend to buy products that are highly rated by Consumers Union, manufac-
tured in conformance with voluntary standards, and sold by members of the Better Business
Bureau. See LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, CONSUMERISM IN THE EIGHTIES 19-21 (1982) (in
opinion poll, Consumers Union and Better Business Bureau were rated first and second on
effectiveness in protecting interests of consumers); Singer, supra note 46, at 721 ("many con-
sumers rely on 'seals of approval' "); Bluestone, supra note 59, at 135 ("whether they're buying
automobiles or life insurance ... or practically anything else-millions of shoppers won't
plunk down their money until they consult Consumer Reports").
61. Negotiated rulemaking and compulsory private arbitration provide two more exam-
ples of private actors without the legal power to bind parties but with the practical power to do
so. See supra notes 41-45, 49-51 and accompanying text. For an interesting short history on
the blurring of differences between public and private power, see Phillips, The Inevitable Inco-
herence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 683, 721-33 (1984).
62. For an overview of the history and evolution of administrative agencies, see M. BERN-
STEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 13-73 (1955); S. BREYER &
R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 22-40 (1985); R.
CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 19416 (1941); . FREEDMAN,
CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
4-6 (1980); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
§§ 2.2-2.4 (1985) [hereinafter PIERCE & SHAPIRO]; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, §§ 1.10-1.11.
63. The first session of the First Congress enacted a statute delegating rulemaking author-
ity to the President, 1 Stat. 95 (1789), and adjudicatory authority and licensing powers to port
collectors, I Stat. 29 (1798); 1 Stat. 55 (1789).
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(ICC) in 1887.4 During the past one hundred years, however, as the
number of public regulators has grown so has the number of private reg-
ulators. Moreover, the growth periods for both types of regulators have
occurred during the same periods of time: the turn of the century,6"
during the New Deal era,66 and the 1970s.67
64. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1-1240 (1982)) (regulating railroad industry).
65. Around the turn of the century, when Congress established such new governmental
agencies as the ICC and the Federal Trade Commission, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1987)), the private sector also assumed regulatory-
type activities. Private professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, were appointed to their own
governmental licensing boards, see generally S. GROSS, supra note 24, at 56-58, 98, and land-
owners were given the authority to control the use of property in their neighborhoods and
communities, see, ag., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1916) (holding
constitutional an ordinance prohibiting property owner from erecting a billboard unless prop-
erty owner obtained consent from majority of nearby property owners); Eubank v. City of
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance authorizing "the
owners of two-thirds of the property abutting on any street" to request the committee on
streets to establish a building line). In the absence of specific legislative authority, the Ameri-
can Bar Association began accrediting law schools, see The American Bar Association's Role in
the Law School Accreditation Process A Report of the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 195 (1982), the predecessor to the Better Business
Bureau began to monitor truth in advertising and to develop advertising codes and standards,
see WANSLEY, HISTORY AND TRADITONS (Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., 1983),
and the private standards-setting organizations began to establish voluntary standards, see
Hamilton, supra note 33, at 1368.
66. During the New Deal era of the 1930s, Congress created another round of govern-'
mental agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, Security Exchange Act
of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, § 4, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78A-KK (1987)),
the Federal Communications Commission, 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1934), and the National Labor
Relations Board, National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-183). During this era, Congress also delegated to the private
sector the authority to create codes of fair competition, see, eg., Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 824, pt. 111(g), construed in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
310-12 (1936) (held unconstitutional), to approve the issuance of agricultural marketing or-
ders, Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 127, 15 U.S.C. §§ 828-852 (1937), repealed by
Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 649, 651 (1966), construed in Sunshine Anthracite Coal
Co. v. Adkins, Collector of Internal Revenue, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940) (held constitutional),
and to license and discipline security dealers, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3 to 78s (1934). During this
same period, private actors formed Consumers Union to provide consumers with information
on goods and services. CONSUMER REPORTS, 1986 BUYING GUIDE ISSUE 2 (1985).
67. During the 1970s, Congress created a third round of federal regulatory agencies, see
generally T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 113-24 (2d ed. 1979); PIERCE & SHAPIRO, supra
note 62, at 34-36, including the Environmental Protection Agency, Reorganization Plan
Number Three of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 1563 (1970), the Consumer Product Safety Commission,
Consumer Products Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083) (1987)), the Occupational Health and Safety Administra-
tion Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678) (1987)), and the Department of Energy, Department of
Energy Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 567 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7101-7375) (1987)). While Congress was establishing these federal agencies, the private
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The question whether this parallel development of public and pri-
vate regulators is coincidental or is causally related goes beyond the
scope of this Article. Undoubtedly, some of the private sector's initiatives
were influenced by such factors as the independent need to standardize
products68 and build consumer confidence in the marketplace. Other ini-
tiatives were stimulated by the threat of governmental regulation.69 Re-
gardless of the reasons, this parallel development highlights another
similarity between public and private regulators.
C. Parallel Justifications for Private and Public Regulators
Congress delegates lawmaking and adjudicatory responsibilities to
public and private regulators for similar reasons, although there are sev-
eral reasons for Congress to delegate to private regulators rather than
70public ones.
sector increased its involvement in making laws and adjudicating disputes. Both state legisla-
tures and Congress created compulsory private arbitration programs for adjudicating disputes.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Congress and federal agencies formalized the use of
private consensual standards. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. Governmental
agencies began developing rules through negotiation among interested public and private par-
ties. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. After many years of governmental use of
advisory committees, Congress enacted a law to formalize and regulate this source of private
input into governmental decision making. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app.
(1982 & Supp. 11983, Supp. 111984, Supp. III 1985, Supp. IV 1986); see Perritt & Wilkinson,
supra note 38, at 729 ("Congressional concern that the proliferation, duplication, and power of
advisory committees effectively had made them 'a fifth arm of government' prompted Congress
to consider methods of preventing advisory committee abuses."). And the Security and Ex-
change Commission recognized the private Financial Accounting and Standards Board as the
official source of accounting principles. See P. MILLER & R. RUDDiNG, THE FASB: THE
PEOPLE, THE PROCESS, AND THE POLMCS 16-22, 47-50 (1986); Strother, The Establishment
of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, 28 VAND L. REv. 201, 211-21 (1975).
68. See, eg., Hamilton, supra note 33, at 1331-32..
69. See Ginsberg, Administration Efforts To Enhance The Opportunities For Self-Regula-
tion, 35 LAB. L.J. 731 (1984) (self-regulation "has been implemented to avoid potential or even
threatened governmental regulation.... Increased involvement from self-certification can also
help a firm to develop the knowledge it needs to argue against additional outside controls").
70. First, certain forms of private regulation involve more democratic decision making
than that exercised by public regulators. Although public regulators typically provide for pub-
lic input into rulemaking and adjudication, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556, 557 (1982), public regu-
lators are usually not elected and tend to be politically independent. As a result, public
regulators have been criticized as nonmajoritarian and unaccountable to the public. See J.
FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 71-72. This particular criticism is blunted by the use of some
forms of private regulation that provide for active citizen participation in lawmaking and adju-
dication. For instance, some zoning laws have given private landowners the authority to ap-
prove or veto certain land uses. Moreover, advisory committees and negotiated rulemaking
proceedings give citizens additional opportunities to participate in governmental decision mak-
ing.
Second, because some forms of private regulation provide greater opportunities for af-
fected parties to participate, the affected parties might find the decisions more acceptable. See
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The first, and probably primary, reason Congress delegates govern-
mental tasks to public regulators is their expertise.71 This expertise ra-
tionale is also used to justify reliance on private regulators.7 2 Private
actors may have firsthand experience with the types of problems that call
for governmental action.
73
Second, by delegating to professional, expert public regulators, Con-
gress reduces political influence over certain regulatory tasks.74 To the
Lawrence, supra note 16, at 656-57. For example, interested parties in a negotiated rulemak-
ing proceeding might find the final rule more acceptable because they participate actively in the
development of the rule, and licensees might find the decisions of governmental licensing
boards more acceptable because their colleagues sit on those boards.
Third, the use of private regulators provides a vehicle for Congress to expand public re-
sources through the use of private resources. Government accomplishes this expansion benefit
by utilizing private experts on a voluntary basis or aper diem stipend basis, which is usually
less expensive than hiring these experts as consultants or full-time employees. See Lawrence,
supra note 16, at 656-57. This benefit accrues, for example, when government relies on an
advisory committee for input and then pays the experts on the committee a stipend or only
reimburses them for actual expenses, or when an agency convenes a negotiating group for
developing a proposed regulation and then does not compensate the experts in the group.
Finally, the use of private regulators might provide a politically feasible interim route for
regulating a marketplace when there is not sufficient political consensus for government to
establish a new public regulator. See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 655-56. This might explain
the history of the development of certain health and safety standards. Perhaps as a result of a
lack of political consensus from the late 1800s to the 1970s, government and the public relied
heavily on private standards-setting organizations rather than establishing governmental agen-
cies to issue standards. Due to some alleged abuses by these private organizations, in the early
1970s a political consensus developed for Congress to establish several new federal agencies.
As these new agencies formulated standards, however, the agencies continued to work with the
private standards-setting organizations. See supra notes 33-37, 46-48 and accompanying text.
71. For example, rather than developing detailed safety and health standards itself, Con-
gress has delegated this complex task to specialized agencies such as the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental Protection
Agency. These agencies have the technical staff and expertise to formulate legal standards and
to adjudicate complex disputes. See J. COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 18 (1927); Jaffe, supra note 21, at 211-12; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 35-37 (1965).
72. See Jaffe, supra note 21, at 212; Note, Delegation of Governmental Power To Private
Groups, 32 COLuM. L. REv. 80-81 (1932); Note, Delegation of Power To Private Parties, 37
COLUM. L. REv. 447, 448 (1937); Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority
To Private Groups, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1398, 1400 (1954).
73. As Professor Jaffe so pointedly stated, "Those performing the operation or constitut-
ing a part of the relation to be regulated are likely to have a more urgent sense of the problem
and the possibilities of effective solution: experience, and experiment lie immediately at hand."
Jaffe, supra note 21, at 212.
These private sector experts, however, might not be available to government because they
are expensive to hire and are often committed to private employers. Lawrence, supra note 16,
at 656-57. Government gains access to these private experts by appointing them to govern-
mental licensing boards and advisory committees and by using consensual standards formu-
lated by private standards-setting organizations. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 212.
74. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 59-77; J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEsS 111 (1938).
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extent that this benefit is actually realized, the same benefit also arises
from delegations to private regulators.75
Third, Congress delegates certain tasks to administrative agencies
because of their flexibility.7 6 Private regulators may even be more flexi-
ble because they may be less bureaucratic and less constrained by consti-
tutional restrictions and mandated administrative procedures.77
Fourth, Congress delegates tasks that require consistent and contin-
uous action to administrative agencies.78 This type of task also can be
accomplished by private regulators, as was the development of generally
accepted accounting principles by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board.
Finally, in order to conserve its limited time and resources, Con-
gress delegates governmental tasks to both public and private
regulators.
79
This comparative examination of the powers, histories, and justifica-
tions for public and private regulators reveals several significant similari-
ties between the Fourth and Fifth Branches. In contrast, the next section
examines a distinguishing feature of constitutional significance: public
and private regulators are subject to different levels of public
accountability.
D. Nonparallel Systems of Accountability and Restrictions
Most public regulators are subject to extensive constitutional, statu-
tory, and supervisory restrictions.8 0 Most private regulators are not sub-
75. This occurs when government appoints primarily private licensees to professional i-
censing boards, when regulatory agencies defer to accounting principles developed by the pri-
vate Financial Accounting Standards Board, and when Congress delegates the licensing of
security dealers to private associations.
76. See J. COMER, supra note 71, at 16-17.
77. See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 654-55.
Certainly government operates under special demands for regularity and predictabil-
ity and is subject to constitutional requirements of fairness; these factors may impose
rigidities on government that do not apply to private actors, and they may thereby
cause a government agency to be less open than a private agency to innovation and
less flexible in dealing with complex situations....
However, most of the rigidity that affects government, so far as it exists at all,
probably results not so much from the fact that it typically is bureaucratic .... While
not all private groups are nonbureaucratic, it is often true that a private group to
which a governmental power is being delegated is less bureaucratic than the alterna-
tive public group, and for that reason it may be advantageous to make the delegation.
Id. at 654-55.
78. See L. JAFFE, supra note 71, at 35-37.
79. See L. JAFE, supra note 71, at 35-36; Jaffe, supra note 21, at 211-12.
80. See infra notes 83-99 accompanying text.
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ject to such restrictions."1 The degree to which private regulators are
held accountable depends on the nature of the relationship between the
private actor and the public sector.8 2 To appreciate the extent to which
private regulators are free of regulation, one must understand the extent
to which public regulators are held accountable.
First, public regulators are subject to constitutional restrictions: as
state actors, they may not abridge freedom of religion, speech, or press,
8 3
nor may they deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.8 4 In contrast, strictly private actors are not so con-
strained by the Constitution. 5 For instance, they are not constitution-
ally prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race 6 or taking
another's property without a hearing.8 7
Second, public regulators are often made accountable for their ac-
tions by statute.88 These statutory obligations include disclosure require-
ments, restrictions on employee activities, and mandatory decision-
making procedures.8 9 Courts have strictly interpreted these statutes to
81. See generally H. LINDE, G. BUNN, F. PAlF, & W. L. CHURCH, LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES ch. 6 (1981) (discussing techniques for holding private delegates
accountable); Lawrence, supra note 16, at 659-62.
82. See infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
85. To invoke the state action doctrine, a plaintiff must show (1) that a party has inter-
fered with plaintiff's constitutional rights, and (2) that the party acted "under color" of state
law. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). For a discussion of the differ-
ences between public and private actors, see infra notes 214-53, 277-85 and accompanying text.
86. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
87. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
88. See generally Strauss, Disqualifications of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 990 (1980); Note, Fighting Conflicts of Interest in Officialdom: Constitutional
and Practical Guidelines for State Financial Disclosure Laws, 73 MICH. L. REv. 758 (1975);
Note, Government Fraud, Waste and Abuse A Practical Guide to Fighting Official Corruption,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 1027 (1983); Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Former Government
Employees, 90 YALE L.J. 189 (1980).
89. To facilitate public monitoring of governmental activities, the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), requires government agencies to make certain information
publicly available, and the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982), provides
for public access to the deliberations of collegial agencies.
To facilitate public monitoring of potential conflicts of interest, financial disclosure laws
require certain government employees to file detailed financial reports. See, e.g., Legislative
Personnel Financial Disclosure Requirements, 2 U.S.C. ch. 18 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Exec-
utive Personnel Financial Disclosure Requirements, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 201-211 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985); Judicial Personnel Financial Disclosure Requirements, 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-309
(1982). To avoid actual conflicts of interest, other statutes forbid government employees from
engaging in certain activities, such as participation in a matter in which the employee has a
financial interest, 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C § 528 (1982), and partici-
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apply only to public actors, not to private ones.90
Third, public regulators are subject to indirect electoral accountabil-
ity to the extent that they are appointed by public officials who are them-
selves subject to direct electoral accountability.91 Private regulators are
not always subject to even this degree of accountability. 92 The more at-
tenuated the relationship between a private actor and the'government,
the less the private actor is held politically accountable. Formal depu-
ties, such as members of state licensing boards, are more accountable to
the electorate than are purely private standards-setting organizations
such as the Consumers Union and the Better Business Bureau. Yet, even
purely private organizations are subject to minimal political accountabil-
ity: they have an incentive to act in a politically responsible way in order
to avoid governmental regulation or takeover by elected officials who
may be held electorally accountable for relying on the private sector.
93
Fourth, public regulators are subject to extensive legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial oversight.94 Congress regulates the activities of public
regulators through oversight hearings, studies by the General Account-
ing Office and Congressional Budget Office, changes in enabling legisla-
pation by a former government employee in certain government matters, 18 U.S.C. § 207
(1982).
To encourage sound governmental decision making, the Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act requires agencies to follow detailed notice and hearing procedures when it issues
regulations or adjudicates cases. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-558 (1982).
90. Courts have rejected application of the Freedom of Information Act to private organi-
zations. See, eg., Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 179-80 (1980) (private organization receiv-
ing federal financial assistance); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. HEW, 668 F.2d 537,
543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (medical peer review committee); Irwin Memorial Blood Bank v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1979) (American Red Cross). The
National Academy of Sciences has not qualified as a public agency even though it must report
to Congress, performs investigations for departments of the federal government, and receives
most of its funds from federal contracts. Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 793-94, 802
(D.C. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
91. Federal public regulators are nominated by the President and are subject to confirma-
tion by the U.S. Senate. U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2.
92. See Perritt, supra note 42, at 1694 ("private delegates are even less politically account-
able than agency officials"); Lawrence, supra note 16, at 684 ("the sorts of institutional safe-
guards that guard against self-interested action by public decisionmakers are absent with
respect to private lawmakers").
93. See Ginsberg, Administration Efforts to Enhance the Opportunities for Self-Regulation,
35 LABOR L.J. 731 (1984) (Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs Office of
U.S. Office of Management and Budget said self-regulation "has been implemented to avoid
potential or even threatened governmental regulation.... [I]ncreased involvement from self-
certification can also help a firm to develop the knowledge it needs to argue against additional
outside controls."); see also infra text accompanying notes 121-23.
94. See generally PIERCE & SHAPIRO, supra note 62, § 5.1, chs. 3, 4 (1985). For a study of
governmental oversight in New York State, see Abramson, Regulating the Regulators in New
York State - Part I, 58 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22 (1986).
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tion, and appropriations. 9" The President controls the activities of
executive agencies through appointment and removal of top policy-mak-
ing officials, implementation of reorganizational plans, review of pro-
posed regulations, and actions by the Office of Management and Budget
to shape budgetary requests and clear legislative proposals.9 6 The judici-
ary, upon the initiative of interested parties, ensures that agency actions
stay within constitutional and legislative bounds. 97 The systematic over-
sight applied to public regulators usually does not apply to private regu-
lators, although sporadic governmental oversight occurs when the public
is made aware of deficiencies in private regulation.98
Finally, in limited circumstances, public regulators are subject to
accountability under tort law: private citizens can sue government offi-
cials individually or the government itself for damages, injunctive relief,
and declaratory judgment. Even though doctrines of sovereign immunity
and official immunity significantly restrict this mode of public accounta-
bility, important opportunities exist for tort suits against public regula-
tors.99 Private regulators are also subject to civil process,l"o but do not
enjoy the immunities that protect public agencies.
Only some private regulators are subject to the extensive institu-
tional restrictions of most public regulators. Most private regulators are
subject to more limited and less developed restrictions. For example, the
powers of private regulators are limited by nondelegation doctrines that
prohibit government delegation of essential lawmaking powers and Arti-
cle III judicial powers. 10 1 Moreover, if the private activities amount to
state action within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, the activities are subject to constitutional restrictions.102 Whether
or not other restrictions apply depends on the details and the nature of
the relationship between the public sector and the private actor. The type
of relationship also determines the category of public-private regulatory
relationships into which a private actor will fall.
Of the three categories, 103 Category A actors-formally deputized
private regulators-are most likely to be subject to the extensive restric-
tions set out above. Because these private regulators are by definition
95. PIERCE & SHAPIRO, supra note 62, at ch. 3.
96. Id at §§ 4.1, 4.3, 9.5.
97. d at § 5.1; 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
98. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
99. See B. ScHwARTZ, supra note 54, at §§ 9.17-.27; P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT
(1983).
100. See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 125-84, 270-76 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 185-253, 272-96 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
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public actors, they are usually subject to constitutional restrictions, dis-
closure rules, conflict-of-interest laws,"° and legislative, executive, and
judicial oversight.105
Category B actors-those who have a formal connection with gov-
ernment-maintain a variety of public-private relationships. The details
of each relationship determine whether a particular Category B organiza-
tion is subject to the conventional system of public accountability and
restrictions. For example, if the private actors function as a governmen-
tal advisory committee, their activities are at least subject to the open
meetings and freedom-of-information laws set forth in the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act. 106 When a rules-negotiation group acts as an advi-
sory committee it should be subject to the same controls, because in such
a case the group's work product is technically a recommendation to an
agency head.'0 7 In contrast, even if a federal agency adopts a private
national consensus standard, 08 the private standard developer would
probably not be subject to these controls because it is autonomous from
the federal agency.
Finally, Category C actors-having no formal connection with gov-
ernment-are purely private actors. Their activities are usually exempt
from the constitutional and statutory constraints'0 9 and the systematic
legislative, executive, and judicial oversight that apply to public actors.1 0
These private actors, along with some Category B organizations,"' are
instead subject to a less developed, ad hoc system of civil law accounta-
bility and restrictions. For instance, if a private secured party seizes the
security upon default without obtaining a judicial determination," 2 he
must do so without breaching the peace."t 3 If a private warehouse owner
104. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
106. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983, Supp.
11 1984, Supp. 111 1985, Supp. IV 1986).
107. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (1982).
108. See, eg., 29 U.S.C. § 655(a), (b)(8) (1982) (Secretary of Labor shall promulgate "as an
occupational safety or health standard any national consensus standard" unless standard
would not improve safety or health.).
109. See supra notes 83-100 accompanying text; infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
112. In this situation the secured party acts, as a judge in a creditor-debtor dispute. The
secured party determines whether the debtor is in default and then enforces the functional
equivalent of a judgment by taking possession of the property. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) § 9-503.
113. See, e.g., People v. Halliday, 237 A.D. 302, 303, 261 N.Y.S. 342, 344 (3d Dep't 1932)
(vendor does not have authority to retake property if doing so will cause breach of peace);
Hilliman v. Cobado, 131 Misc. 2d 206, 499 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (secured party who
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wants to dispose of stored property, she must do so in accordance with
law" 4 or be held liable for damages and possibly conversion." 5 If a pri-
vate retailer does not have a reasonable belief that a person is shoplifting,
the retailer might be held liable for defamation and false imprison-
ment.' 16 And if a purely private organization such as the Better Business
Bureau publishes a report with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity,
the organization might be held liable for defamation and intentional in-
terference with a business relationship." 7 Finally, if a private organiza-
tion is a " 'quasi-public' institution, [it] owes its members a general duty
to provide fair and impartial procedures, to base its decisions on the evi-
dence, and to avoid arbitrary and capricious actions.""' 8
committed breach of peace was not permitted to repossess cattle because he disregarded orders
by debtor and sheriff to leave premises).
114. See, eg., Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210.
115. For a case decided prior to the enactment of UCC § 7-210, see Weinstein v. Santini
Transfer Co., 155 Misc. 139, 278 N.Y.S. 388 (City Ct. 1935). In Weinstein, a warehouse
owner's sale of stored goods for payment of storage charges constituted conversion of goods
when he failed to comply with the state lien law. The warehouse owner was liable for the value
of the stored goods.
116. See, eg., Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dep't Store, 12 Mich. App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347
(1968) (shopper accused of shoplifting by private store security officer), modified, 383 Mich.
90, 174 N.W.2d 765 (1970); Zayre of Va., Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 S.E.2d 710 (1966)
(plaintiffs recovered damages for defamation and false imprisonment after private store secur-
ity guard falsely accused them of stealing).
117. Antwerp Diamond Exch. v. Better Business Bureau, 130 Ariz. 523, 637 P.2d 733
(1981); see also Montgomery v. Dennison, 363 Pa. 255, 69 A.2d 520 (1949). In Montgomery,
the director of the Better Business Bureau acted on an anonymous telephone tip and sent out
letters alleging that the plaintiff had accepted a bribe. The director was held liable for libel and
defamation because he acted without probable cause. Furthermore, the court found he acted
with malice by mailing letters to eight people, when one letter to the proper authority would
have generated an appropriate investigation. Plaintiff was awarded compensation as well as
general damages for pain and suffering.
118. North Jersey Secretarial School v. National Ass'n of Trade and Technical Schools,
597 F. Supp. 477, 479 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated for want of subject matter jurisdiction, 802 F.2d
1483 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (district court found due process analogy appropriate and found that
due process had been provided); see also Maijorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (increasing im-
portance of private associations has led to increased judicial supervision), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970); Wisconsin Ave. Assocs. v. 2720 Wisconsin Ave. Coop. Ass'n, 441 A.2d 956, 963
(D.C. 1982) ("Like promoters or directors of a corporation, developers of a housing coopera-
tive occupy a fiduciary position with respect to the individual members of the cooperative."),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982); Gashgai v. Maine Medical Ass'n, 350 A.2d 571, 575 (Me.
1976) (based on the association's by-laws, court applied a contract rationale to justify judicial
intervention into its activities); Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 596,
170 A.2d 791, 799 (1961) ("in a case presenting sufficiently compelling factual and policy
considerations, judicial relief will be available to compel admission to membership [to a private
voluntary membership association]"). See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associa-
tions Not For Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930); Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private
Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983 (1963).
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Purely private actors are also held accountable to the public under
antitrust laws. '19 Holding antitrust laws applicable to an association of
manufacturers, the Supreme Court characterized the private actors as
"in reality an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the
regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judi-
cial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations....
Other limiting influences on Category C regulators are market
forces and direct government intervention. If a private regulator per-
forms poorly, for example if the Better Business Bureau does not enforce
its code of ethics, a more effective competitor might emerge. Ultimately,
the new competitor could put the BBB out of business. Moreover, if an
ineffective private regulator comes to the attention of public officials, 21
they might impose specific accountability obligations on the private regu-
lator... or assume the responsibilities of the private regulator.
1 23
These differing systems of accountability form the crucial distinction
between the Fourth and Fifth Branches of government, a distinction that
warrants explicit consideration when courts evaluate the constitutional-
ity of the private regulators' activities. The next section, which outlines
119. Antitrust liability might be found when an economically interested party tries to bias
the decision-making process of a private standards-setting body, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.
v. Indian Head, Inc. 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988), when physicians use a private hospital peer-review
committee to disadvantage a competitor, Patrick v. Burget, U.S.L.W. 4430 (1988), and when
the BBB and an attorney conspire to distribute false and misleading information, Economy
Carpets Mfrs. and Distribs. v. Better Business Bureau, 333 So. 2d 765 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
Antitrust liability was found when the code of ethics of the American Medical Association
made it unethical for doctors to be employed by group health organizations, American Medi-
cal Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 245-48 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943),
when a major hospital in a community restricted the staff privileges of physicians, Weiss v.
York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 791 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985), and
when a private standards-setting organization issued an anticompetitive interpretation of a
voluntary standard, American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982).
120. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 465
(1941) (private organization enforced plan to stop others from copying textile and clothing
designs).
121. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
122. For example, concerns about the way private standards-setting organizations were
developing these standards led Congress to consider imposing restrictions on these private
organizations. See supra note 48. See generally Hanslowe, supra note 16, at 132-34 (discussing
"process of imposing quasi-constitutional limitations on private economic power groups wield-
ing quasi-governmental powers").
123. For example, congressional dissatisfaction with the adequacy of voluntary safety stan-
dards is one reason for the creation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission to establish
governmental safety standards. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY (1970); Hamilton, supra note
33, at 1400-02.
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key constitutional doctrines for evaluating private sector activities, de-
scribes how the Supreme Court has treated this crucial distinction.
III. The Incoherent Constitutional Status
of Private Regulators
The path to understanding the constitutional status of private regu-
lators is paved with four different constitutional doctrines: nondelegation
of lawmaking, nondelegation of Article III judicial power, procedural
due process, and state action. These doctrines form the constitutional
foundation of a Fifth Branch of government. Unfortunately, each of
these areas is fraught with confusion.24 This confusion is compounded
when it becomes necessary to consider the different systems of accounta-
bility for public and private regulators.
A. Federal Nondelegation Doctrines
The federal Constitution prohibits the delegation of essential federal
lawmaking power and Article III judicial power.125 Such delegations are
generally unconstitutional. I26 The nondelegation doctrines are easy to
state, but they present difficult conceptual problems when applied.
The nondelegation doctrines are derived from the separation of
powers principle, which is implicit in the structure of the Constitution.
The separation of powers principle suggests that the core governmental
powers of lawmaking and adjudication should be exercised by separate
branches of government. Exercise of each of these powers is subject to a
system of checks and balances that limits governmental powers, and in
124. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis concluded that the case law of nondelegation to pri-
vate parties "has not crystallized any consistent principles." 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 193 (1978). Soon after the Supreme Court decided Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Professor Martin Redish characterized the
Article III cases as "a distinguished-if largely confused and unprincipled-line of cases."
Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and The Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
DUKE L.J. 197, 228 (1983). He also criticized the procedural due process cases for failing to
make progress "toward establishing broad guidelines for treating the question of how much
process is due." Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 456 (1986). The late Judge Friendly declared that Professor
Charles Black's 1967 description of state action cases as a "conceptual disaster area" is still
accurate. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1289, 1290 (1982); see Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Forward: State Action, Equal
Protection, and California Proposition Fourteen, 84 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
125. Because delegation of executive power is not usually the subject of private regulation,
such delegation is not discussed in this section.
126. See infra notes 131, 158-62 and accompanying text.
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turn protects thd public from governmental tyranny. 127 But the separate
branches were not intended to be airtight; as a matter of governmental
necessity, the exercise of these powers has not been, and could not be,
fully separated. Shared exercise of powers, including delegation to ad-
ministrative agencies, is essential to effective government.
128
Although the Supreme Court has made an effort to accommodate
delegations, the Court has failed to produce a coherent approach to eval-
uating their constitutionality. 129 The delegation of power to private
actors puts even greater stress on the nondelegation doctrines because
private actors are not subject to the same system of constitutional, statu-
tory, and oversight restrictions as public actors. 30 But this crucial differ-
ence in accountability has been handled erratically, and sometimes even
ignored, by the Supreme Court. As a result, the Court has also produced
an incoherent approach to the constitutional evaluation of private
delegations.
1. Federal Nondelegation of Lawmaking
The nondelegation of lawmaking doctrine does not bar all delega-
127. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) ("The doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to pre-
clude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy."). See generally C. MONTESQUiEU, THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS in 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 70 (Hutchins ed. 1952); THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at
343 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison) (B.
Wright ed. 1961).
128. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985)
("To hold otherwise [in this Article III case] would be to erect a rigid and formalistic restraint
on the ability of Congress to adopt innovative measures."); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, Collector of Internal Revenue, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) ("Delegation by Congress has
long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not
become a futility."); see also R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION
chs. VI, X, XI (1941). See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47 & 48 (J. Madison); I K.
DAVIS, supra note 124, at §§ 2:2-2:5, 3:2-3:4; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRA-
TIvE ACTION 28-35 (1965).
129. See infra notes 131-46, 158-79 and accompanying text.
130. See, eg,, National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); see also supra notes 80-123 and accompanying text.
As attention to this area of our law [nondelegation doctrine] grows, it refocuses
thought on one of the rationales against excessive delegation: the harm done thereby
to principles of political accountability. Such harm is doubled in degree in the con-
text of a transfer of authority from Congress to an agency and then from agency to
private individuals. The vitality of challenges to the former type of transfer is sus-
pect, but to the latter, unquestionable.
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'm, 737 F.2d at 1143 n.41.
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tion of lawmaking powers, only delegation of "essential" functions.131
Throughout the history of nondelegation doctrine, the United States
Supreme Court has employed a series of flexible,132 incoherent, 133 and
"theoretically unsatisfactory"'134 constitutional tests. These tests include
"contingency" theory: the legislature may make a legislative determina-
tion conditional upon a delegate's finding that a certain contingency has
occurred;135 "fill up the details" theory: the legislature may enact a pri-
mary standard and then delegate to an administrator the limited respon-
sibility of implementing the details; 36 and "intelligible principle" theory:
delegation is proper if the legislature articulates an objective to guide the
exercise of delegated powers. 37 The Court has also used narrow statu-
131. See, e-g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935):
The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.... The Constitution has
never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility
and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies
and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the
policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.
See also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825):
It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts, or to any other
tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise it-
self ... The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important sub-
jects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who
are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.
132. See L. JAFF, supra note 128, at 48-73, 85.
133. See Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine Could The Court Give It Substance?, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1229-31 (1985).
134. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 78-80.
135. See, eg., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680, 692-93 (1892). Upholding the delegation,
the Field Court found that the legislature had properly exercised its discretion by providing
that tariffs should be imposed on imported goods when the President finds that such tariffs are
needed. The delegation to the President was limited to ascertaining the requisite fact that
tariffs were needed. See also The Cargo of Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 384 (1813).
The Aurora Court upheld delegation to the President of the power to declare when Europeans
"ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," a finding which would termi-
nate a congressionally imposed retaliatory embargo against European trade. For a more de-
tailed discussion of this theory, see S. BARBER, THE CONSTrruTON AND THE DELEGATION
OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER, 53-63 (1975).
136. See, eg, Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (upholding congres-
sional delegation to federal courts to promulgate their own procedural rules; courts were only
"fill[ing] up the details"); see also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 509, 516-17 (1911)
(upholding a congressional delegation to the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate rules and
regulations to preserve public forest lands). For a more detailed discussion of this theory, see
S. BARBER, supra note 135, at 63-72.
137. See, eg., J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 401-02, 409
(1928). In Hampton, the Court upheld delegation to the President of authority to adjust tariff
rates when the rates failed to "equalize... differences in costs of production." Even though
the delegation gave the President authority to exercise his discretion, the Court upheld the
tory construction to avoid the delegation issue.
138
These diverse judicial approaches have not made it difficult to pre-
dict how the Supreme Court will decide a delegation question because,
regardless of its doctrinal basis, the Court has almost always upheld dele-
gations of power. 139 Until recently, it was suggested that the nondelega-
tion doctrine was "abandoned,"" was "dead, '  was "almost a
complete failure,"' 42 "has had no reality in the holdings"' 43 and, in a
more positive characterization, operated only as a "caveat, a hint of re-
served power."'"
delegated power because Congress had laid down "an intelligible principle" to define the au-
thority. See also Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 494,496 (1904) (upholding delegation to
administrator authority to establish uniform standards for importing tea because Congress had
fixed a "primary standard"-to exclude the lowest grade of tea); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The two
later cases, Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry, are significant not only because they are
the only two cases declaring delegation of lawmaking power to a government official unconsti-
tutional, but also because the Court's reasoning in each case involved a variation on the "intel-
ligible principle" theory. In Panama Refining, the Court found that delegation to the
President failed to include an intelligible principle for regulating interstate transportation of
petroleum products in contravention of state law. 293 U.S. at 406-08, 410, 415-20. In
Schechter Poultry, the Court could not find an intelligible principle that would support the
delegation to the President of the authority to approve "codes of fair competition" proposed
by the private sector. 295 U.S. at 529-42. See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 419-
20 (1944). In Yakus the Court used an intelligible principle analysis to uphold broad delega-
tion of economic power to fix prices for goods and services. The standards required the admin-
istrator to effectuate the statutory objectives and to issue regulations that "in his judgment
[are] generally fair and equitable." The Supreme Court recently applied the intelligible princi-
ple test to uphold the delegation of "significant discretion" to the independent U.S. Sentencing
Commission. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 654-58 (1989). For a more detailed
discussion of this theory, see S. BARBER, supra note 135, at 72-107.
138. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 257 U.S. 116, 117-18, 123-30 (1958) (narrowly construing
Secretary of State's authority to issue passports, Court invalidated regulation denying pass-
ports to members of Communist Party); see also National Cable Television Ass'n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336, 337, 341-43 (1974) (narrowly construing enabling statute of Federal
Communications Commission, Court avoided constitutional question raised by alleged delega-
tion of power to tax). For a recent example of this technique, see Industrial Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (restricting authority of
Occupational Safety and Health Administration by interpreting broad delegation narrowly and
concluding that "[in the absence of a clear mandate in the act, it is unreasonable to assume
that Congress intended to give the [administrator] the unprecedented power").
139. The only two exceptions are Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry. See supra note
137. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 124, at §§ 3:1, 3:2.
140. Justice Marshall has concluded that the doctrine "has been virtually abandoned by
the Court for all practical purposes" except when personal liberties are involved. Federal
Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
141. Schoenbrod, supra note 133, at 1233.
142. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 713 (1969).
143. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 124, at 150.
144. L. JArsE, supra note 71, at 85.
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A growing number of Supreme Court justices have expressed re-
newed interest in applying the nondelegation doctrine to congressional
delegations.145 This renewed interest has stimulated a variety of pro-
posed answers to the question: When is a delegation unconstitutional?
The diversity of the responses indicates the great difficulty involved in
formulating a coherent nondelegation doctrine.1 46
145. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, Burger, CJ., joining). Justice Relnquist would have held
that the delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency was unconstitutional in
American Petroleum Inst, a position with which Chief Justice Burger agreed in American
Textile Mfrs. In Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59
(1983), a majority of the Court, consisting of Chief Justice Burger joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, held unconstitutional a legislative veto provision
that improperly delegated legislative power to one house of Congress. In Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986), Justice Burger joined by Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor, held unconstitutional a delegation of executive power to an officer of Congress-the
Comptroller General. Concurring separately, Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Marshall
joined, would also have held the delegation an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
478 U.S. at 737.
146. These proposals include the following: a theory of separation of powers at "the very
apex of government," under which separation of functions and checks and balances apply only
to Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, see Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Gov-
ernment: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 667 (1984);
an "institutional competence" theory under which courts would declare unconstitutional any
delegation of power if its proper exercise is "closely dependent upon the unique institutional
competence of Congress," see J. FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 94; and the "doctrine of consti-
tutional supremacy," under which the Constitution is viewed as the supreme law that specifies
a certain arrangement of offices and powers, and Congress may not destroy this constitutional
arrangement through abdication, see S. BARBER, supra note 135, at 36-37. See also Freedman,
Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence (Book Review), 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 307,
310-311 (1976). Another proposal is "Article I review/ultra vires review," under which courts
would first undertake a review under Article I to determine whether the legislature has per-
formed its fundamental constitutional task of setting basic governmental policy. See Note,
Rethinking the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 B.U.L. REv. 257 (1982). According to this ap-
proach, courts would rarely assess a legislature's power to delegate because most administra-
tive action is interstitial. The first part of this inquiry is limited to ensuring that the legislature
has provided the necessary guidelines. In the second part of the analysis, a court determines
whether the agency has acted within the scope of its delegated power.
Another approach is a theory of "strict application" of the nondelegation doctrine with an
enlightened view of legislative power. Schoenbrod, supra note 133, at 1252-60, 1275-81. Pro-
fessor Schoenbrod focuses on whether the delegation involves power that is "legislative" in
character. Many of the hard cases, he contends, do not involve legislative power. He suggests
that legislative power does not involve interpretation or application of rules, nor the exercise of
powers that are "executive" in character. He further refines the definition of legislative power
by distinguishing between "rules" statutes and "goals" statutes.
Finally, Professor Davis proposes a theory of nondelegation based on adequate adminis-
trative safeguards against arbitrary powers. 1 K. DAViS, supra note 124, at § 3:15. Professor
Davis recommends adopting a reconstituted nondelegation doctrine whose "purpose should be
neither to prevent delegation of legislative power nor to require meaningful statutory stan-
dards; its purpose should be the deeper one of protecting against unnecessary and uncontrolled
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In private-delegation cases, the United States Supreme Court has
further complicated nondelegation theory by failing to give careful atten-
tion to the crucial distinction between a delegation to a private actor and
a delegation to a public one: the differences in their levels of accountabil-
ity.147 The Court's failure is illustrated by a series of four landmark New
Deal cases in which the Court struck down two delegations and upheld
two delegations to the private sector.
148
In both Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States149 and Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.,150 the Supreme Court gave considerable weight to the
difference in the public accountability of public and private regulators.
In both cases, the Court invalidated the delegations. In Schechter, the
Court asked:
But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate
its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups
so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and
discretionary power." Id. at 206. Courts should uphold a delegation "as long as the broad
purpose is discernible and... protections against arbitrary power are provided." Ia at 208.
147. See supra notes 80-123 and accompanying text.
148. Recent decisions of lower federal courts also have inconsistantly analyzed private-
sector action. Some decisions have given attention to the difference in levels of accountability
between public and private actors. See, eg., Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 90 (3d Cir. 1984)
(Becker, J., dissenting) ("[T]he JCAH [Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals]
was not accountable to either the government or the individuals most affected by its deci-
sions." The JCAH, a private organization, was not required to hear all viewpoints, its regula-
tions were not subject to governmental review, and it had unfettered discretion when applying
regulations.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 1131 (1985); Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008, 1014 (3d
Cir. 1977) ("The S.E.C.... should not cavalierly dismiss procedural errors affecting the rights
of those subjected to sanctions but should insist upon meticulous compliance by the private
organiiation [NASD]."); Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 508 F. Supp. 1366, 1375 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) ("The defect lies in the delegation of unguided power to a private entity, whose
self-interest could color its decision to assist licensure of a competitor."), vacated in part on
other grounds, 743 F.2d 326 (1984).
Most decisions, however, have ignored this crucial distinction, limiting their analyses
merely to recognizing the private characteristics of the actor. See, eg., Poe v. Menghini, 339
F. Supp. 986, 994 (D. Kan. 1972); United Citizens Party v. South Carolina State Election
Comm'n, 319 F. Supp. 784, 787 (D.S.C. 1970). Other decisions have upheld delegations to
private regulators by ignoring the differences in accountability and relying instead on reason-
ing used by the Court in Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939), and United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). See, ag., Prudential Property and Casualty Co. v. Insur-
ance Comm'n, 534 F. Supp. 571, 580 (D.S.C. 1982); Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373
F. Supp. 550, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Simon v. Cameron, 337 F. Supp. 1380, 1382-83 (C.D.
Cal. 1970). For a discussion of Currin and Rock Royal Co-op., see infra notes 153-56, 300-07
and accompanying text.
149. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (challenging federal statute that authorized President to approve
codes of fair competition on application of trade group).
150. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (challenging statute that authorized less than all producers and
mine workers to determine maximum daily and weekly hours of labor and labor wages for all
producers and workers).
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beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or in-
dustries?... The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legisla-
tive power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with
the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.
1 51
In Carter Coal, the Court was even more direct, concluding, "This is
legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delega-
tion to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to
private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the inter-
ests of others in the same business." 
152
Several years later, however, in two other cases the Supreme Court
ignored this difference between public and private regulators and upheld
congressional delegation of legislative power to the private sector. 153 In
one case, private tobacco growers were vested with the power to veto any
action by the Secretary of Agriculture designating a tobacco market.
154
In the other case, private milk producers were vested with the power to
veto any agricultural marketing order proposed by the Secretary of Agri-
culture with the approval of the President.1 5 The private actors in these
cases were given the authority to make a governmental decision jointly
with a public officer. And, in both cases, the Court failed to recognize
this public-private partnership, examining the constitutionality of the
delegation to private actors under the same test that it applied to public
delegations. Thus, in part because the Supreme Court has failed to give
consistent attention to the public accountability of private delegates,' 56
the "Court has yet to state a satisfactory theory of the principles gov-
151. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537.
152. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
153. Two turn-of-the-century cases provide another example of the Supreme Court's fail-
ure to analyze the involvement of the private sector in governmental decision making. St.
Louis Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908) (rejecting argument that Congress
had unconstitutionally delegated power to American Railway Association, Court failed to rec-
ognize private sector's role); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (upholding authority
of Secretary of the Treasury to determine which teas may be imported, Court ignored private
sector's role in developing standards for tea); see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)
(upholding state statute, Court ignored authority delegated to private sector to approve an
action before government could institute it). Cf Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S.
608, 613-14 (1937) (recognizing argument that distinction exists between delegation to official
agencies and delegation to private ones).
154. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 6 (1939). Under the federal statute, in any market
designated as a tobacco market, no tobacco could be sold without being inspected and certified
in accordance with agency standards.
155. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 547-48 (1939).
156. Currin, 306 U.S. at 15-16. The Court viewed the authority given to the private sector'
to veto a proposed tobacco market (Currin) or to veto a proposed agricultural marketing order
(Rock Royal Co-op.) as a decision by Congress to "merely place a restriction upon its own
regulation by withholding its operation." Currin, 306 U.S. at 15. The Court viewed the power
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erning the delegation of power to private parties."
157
2. Federal Nondelegation of Article III Judicial Power
The nondelegation of judicial power doctrine generally bars the del-
egation of Article III cases from non-Article III tribunals. 158 The pur-
pose of Article III is to preserve an independent federal judiciary, which
is essential for maintaining the constitutional system of separation of
powers. An independent judiciary also protects "individual litigants
from decisionmakers susceptible to majoritarian pressures."' 59 Article
III establishes an independent judiciary by creating a separate judicial
branch160 and granting life tenure to federal judges during their "good
behavior," with the guarantee that their compensation will not be re-
to veto as the mere power to fill in the details. Id, at 15-16; see infra notes 300-07 and accom-
panying text.
The few commentators who have tried to formulate a coherent private delegation theory
have paid specific attention to the reduced public accountability of private actors. For in-
stance, Professor Freedman concludes that the key to clarifying nondelegation doctrine is to
focus on the "character of the delegate." Freedman, supra note 146, at 334. He asks whether
the "delegate is competent to perform the specific task delegated to him." Id at 335. In
answering this question, Professor Freedman notes that:
One of the reasons that delegations of legislative power to the President are so often
sustained undoubtedly relates to a recognition of his special character as a delegate.
He is a public official, sworn to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United
States, constrained to public spiritedness by the nation's traditions and history's cer-
tain judgment, and within the reach of a number of political and finally electoral
processes.
Id. at 334. In contrast, Professor Freedman points out, "[r]arely are private parties exercising
delegated legislative power circumscribed by such profound imperatives." Id
In a detailed study of private delegations, another commentator has suggested that eight
factors should be weighed when applying the nondelegation doctrine. At least four of these
factors concern the degree to which the private actor is subject to public accountability. Lieb-
mann, supra note 21, at 717-18. These four factors are as follows: (1) "Are the actions of
private delegates subject to no further public or judicial review, or to review only upon attenu-
ated standards such as the substantial evidence rule?"; (2) "Are the private delegates chosen
by a process involving public consent, as by nomination or confirmation by elected officials?";
(3) "Are the private delegates sworn to oaths of office?"; and (4) "Do the private delegates
have pecuniary interests in the determinations to be made?" Id. at 718.
157. Freedman, supra note 146, at 321; see also 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 124, at 193.
158. Professor Redish, however, contends that the work ofa non-Article III tribunal "can-
not be functionally or theoretically distinguished" from the work of an administrative agency.
Redish, supra note 124, at 201.
159. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860 (1986) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting, Marshall, J., joining).
160. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
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duced during their tenure.161 Article III also specifies the types of cases
that fall within the jurisdiction of the federal judicial branch.162 Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court has not coherently elaborated on which
cases must be decided by an Article III court and which cases may be
delegated. 163
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Co.,164 a
plurality attempted to clarify the nondelegation of Article III judicial
power doctrine by reducing the precedent
to three narrow situations not subject to [Article III restrictions]
each recognizing a circumstance in which the grant of power to the
Legislative andExecutive Branches was historically and constitu-
tionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion of a power
to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than threat-
ening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of powers. 165
161. "The Judges... shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
162. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citi-
zens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a state shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Juris-
diction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appel-
late Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1, 2.
163. When the Supreme Court adopted the "inherently judicial" test, which simply bars a
non-Article III court from exercising any power that is "inherently judicial," the Court failed
to define "inherently judicial." See, eg., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856) (proceeding against governmental customs collector did not
involve exercise ofjudicial power); see also Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) (hold-
ing Court of Customs Appeals an Article I court). In a more recent dissenting opinion, Justice
White pointed out that "the Court [in Murray's Lessee] presented no examples of such issues
that are judicial 'by nature' and simply failed to acknowledge that Art. I courts already sanc-
tioned by the Court... were deciding such issues all the time." Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Co., 458 U.S. 50, 107 (1982); see also Redish, supra note 124, at
199.
Another test used by the Court, the "adjunct test," is no easier to administer. Under this
test, "when Congress creates a substantive federal right, it [can assign] to an adjunct some
functions [but the adjunct's functions] must be limited in such a way that 'the essential attrib-
utes' of judicial power are retained in the Art. III court." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80-81.
The meaning of "the essential attributes of judicial power" is unclear.
164. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
165. Id. at 64. Justice White, in his dissent, disagreed with the plurality's assertion that the
three situations were narrow ones. Justice White stated that "[t]he plurality opinion has the
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Of the three "narrow" exceptions to nondelegation,' 66 only the one con-
cerning the public-private rights test 167 is likely to have any constitu-
tional implications for the activities of private regulators. The Court has
upheld delegations of power to adjudicate cases involving "public
rights,"'168 but has strictly prohibited delegations involving "private
rights.'
169
In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,170 the
Supreme Court moved away from Northern Pipeline's strict application
of the public-private rights test and instead applied the test with prag-
matic flexibility. 17 ' The Court blurred the private-public rights distinc-
tion by stating that Congress had created "a seemingly 'private' right
that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the
Article III judiciary."172
The Supreme Court recently continued down its pragmatic path in
appearance of limiting Art. I courts only because it fails to add together the sum of its parts.
Rather than limiting each other, the principles relied upon complement each other; together
they cover virtually the whole domain of possible areas of adjudication." Id. at 105.
166. The plurality's first two "narrow" situations cover the establishment of territorial
courts, id. at 64, and courts-martial, id. at 66.
167. Justice White, dissenting, said he thought the public-private rights distinction had
received its "death blow" in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). Northern Pipeline, 458
U.S. at 109. Strictly applying the public-private rights distinction, the plurality held that the
delegation to Article I bankruptcy judges was unconstitutional because bankruptcy courts ad-
judicate state-created private rights. Id. at 71.
168. The Northern Pipeline plurality stated:
[Tihe public-rights doctrine also draws upon the principle of separation of powers,
and a historical understanding that certain prerogatives were reserved to the political
Branches of Government. The doctrine extends only to matters arising 'between the
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance
of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments' . . . and
only to matters that historically could have been determined exclusively by those
departments."
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
169. "In contrast, 'the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,'
Crowell v. Benson, is a matter of private rights. Our precedents clearly establish that only
controversies in the former category [of public rights] may be removed from Art. III courts
and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination." 1d at
69-70 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
170. 473 U.S. 568 (1985). This case involved an Article III challenge to a compulsory
arbitration program established under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA). The Act authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency to permit one pesticide
company to use data submitted by another company only if the applicant offers to compensate
the original company for use of the data. If the private parties are unable to agree on the
amount of compensation, either party may initiate binding arbitration proceedings. Id at 571-
75 (1975).
171. Id. at 589.
172. Id at 594.
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 173 in which it upheld
an administrative agency's jurisdiction over an Article III common-law
counterclaim. The Court noted that "in reviewing Article III challenges,
we have weighed a number of factors ... with an eye to the practical
effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally as-
signed role of the federal judiciary."174 The Court further muddled the
public-private rights dichotomy by carving out of the private rights cate-
gory a subcategory for state common-law rights-the type of claim "as-
sumed to be at the 'core' of matters normally reserved to Article III
courts."' 175 Rather than prohibit the delegation of all such private state
claims, the Court undertook a "searching" examination of the congres-
sional arrangement to determine what effect delegation would have on
separation of powers. 
176
This practical, but highly judgmental, approach has the advantage
of giving Congress the flexibility "to adopt innovative measures." 177
However, this approach also makes it more difficult to determine
whether a scheme is constitutional because it reduces the "degree of co-
herence in this area of law." '178 Moreover, the practical approach may
inappropriately favor upholding delegations to non-Article III
tribunals. 179
173. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
174. Id. at 851. The Court concluded that "there is little practical reason to find that this
single deviation from the agency model is fatal to the congressional scheme." Id. at 852.
175. Id. at 853.
176. In Schor, the Court found that the "limited CFTC [Commodity Futures Trading
Commission] jurisdiction over a narrow class of common law claims as an incident to the
CFTC's primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function does not create a substantial threat
to the separation of powers." Id, at 854 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985)). The Court viewed "the magnitude of any intrusion on the
Judicial Branch [as] de minimis." Id. at 856.
177. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 594; see also Thomas, Formalism and Functionalism:
From Northern Pipeline To Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 37 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 1003, 1020-36 (1986).
178. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
179. In his Schor dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that this practical approach involves
balancing legislative interests in promoting the benefits of the legislative enactment against
competing interests in judicial independence and that the balance is "weighted against judicial
independence." Id. at 863. Professor Redish agrees with this:
A built-in bias will invariably favor the legislative interest because there is an inher-
ent inequality in the weighing process: an immediately recognizable, concrete inter-
est is balanced against an interest wholly prophylactic in nature, and therefore one
whose benefits will never be immediately recognizable.... [S]alary and tenure provi-
sions protect against subtle or unstated pressure on the judiciary. Presumably, it was
because it would be virtually impossible to detect undue pressure that the framers
chose to insert these prophylactic protections. Thus, any case-by-case balancing pro-
cess will always tend to find the benefit of maintaining these protections illusory.
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In Union Carbide, the only recent Supreme Court case involving an
Article III challenge to a private adjudication, the majority at least rec-
ognized that the non-Article III judges would be private actors. 180 But
in upholding the delegation, the majority did not analyze the implica-
tions of this crucial fact; instead it concluded summarily that delegation
did not "diminish the likelihood of impartial decisionmaking."181 Justice
Brennan, concurring, failed even to observe the private sector involve-
ment; instead, he mischaracterized the actors as public ones.182
This failure to analyze the implications of relying on private adjudi-
cators183 would not threaten the independence of the judiciary if the
Court construed Article III strictly to prohibit any non-Article III tribu-
nal from adjudicating private rights. But, as the Court shifts toward the
more pragmatic and flexible approach adopted in Union Carbide and
Schor,184 its failure becomes significant. By not considering the extent to
Redish, supra note 124, at 221-22; see also Fullerton, No Light At The End Of The Pipeline
Confusion Surrounds Legislative Courts, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 207, 235-40 (1983). Professor
Redish criticizes the public-private rights dichotomy as "a standard wholly unwarranted by
constitutional language, history, policy, or theory." Redish, supra note 124, at 204.
180. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568 (1985). The non-Article III decision maker would have
been a private arbitrator appointed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and
subject to its regulations. The arbitrator's decision would have been final, except for limited
Article III judicial review of "fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct." Id. at 573-74
n.1 (quoting FIFRA § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii)). The regulations of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service emphasize that
[p]ersons who are listed on the Roster and are selected or appointed to hear arbitra-
tion matters or to serve as factfnders do not become employees of the Federal Gov-
ernment by virtue of their selection or appointment. Following selection or
appointment, the arbitrator's relationship is solely with the parties to the dispute.
29 C.F.R § 1404.4(c) (1987).
181. The majority concluded that "[r]emoving the task of evaluation from agency person-
nel to civilian arbitrators, selected by agreement of the parties or appointed on a case-by-case
basis by an independent federal agency, surely does not diminish the likelihood of impartial
decision-making, free from political influence." Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 590 (emphasis
added).
182. Brennan noted that "at its heart the dispute involves the exercise of authority by a
Federal Government arbitrator in the course of administration of FIFRA's comprehensive
regulatory scheme. As such it partakes of the characteristics of a standard agency adjudica-
tion." Id. at 600-01.
183. Recent decisions of lower federal courts also have failed to analyze the implications of
private sector involvement. See, eg., Board of Trustees v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc.,
749 F.2d 1396, 1406 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding delegation to arbitrators "in this limited area
of congressionally created statutory rights" where Article III courts retain "authority to de-
cide de novo all issues of law and to review factual findings for a clear preponderance of the
evidence..."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); United Transp. Union v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1984) ("Since Congress may require
parties to vindicate statutory rights before particularized tribunals, we do not believe a limited
[Article III] review of these tribunals presents an Article III problem.").
184. See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
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which private actors are free from official restraints, the Court may not
accurately assess the impact of private delegation on the independence of
the judiciary. This neglect may undermine the principle of separation of
powers.
B. Procedural Due Process
If delegation is state action,"8 5 the delegate must provide procedural
due process to the parties whose interests are at stake.18 6 Determining
what procedures a delegated actor must employ is not an easy task. The
Constitution provides that government cannot deprive any person "of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"1" 7 but this general
language does not provide much guidance. Nor has the Court developed
a reliable judicial approach to determining what process is due.
Whether an individual involved in a dispute has a constitutional
right to be heard depends on whether the dispute is legislative or adjudi-
cative.'88 In general, a legislative dispute involves legislative facts and
formulation of general rules for future conduct.' 89 An individual usu-
ally will not have a personal right to be heard in a legislative dispute. 90
In contrast, an adjudicative dispute involves adjudicative facts and deter-
mination of the present rights of parties, based on current or past
events.' 9 ' Under these circumstances, an individual usually has a right
to be heard.
192
185. See infra notes 214-52 and accompanying text.
186. Before procedural due process restrictions apply, the private action must constitute
state action and affect a constitutionally protected interest. Private regulatory action might
also be subject to review under substantive due process standards. See infra notes 286-89 and
accompanying text.
187. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
188. See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
189. See, eg., Prentis v. Atlantic Coastline Co., 211 U.S. 210,226 (1908); 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1976); see also K. DAvis, supra note 57, at §§ 7:1-7:3.
190. See, eg., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (Court will rarely overturn agency rulemaking for failure to
use more procedures than required by statute), remand, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also
Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) ("[T]he participants in the food-stamp program had
no greater right to advance notice of the legislative change.., than did any other voters.");
Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("When a proceeding is classified as rulemaking, due process ordinarily does not demand pro-
cedures more rigorous than those provided by Congress."), cert denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
For an interesting argument that due process applies to public and delegated private lawmak-
ing, see Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); see also Lawrence,
supra note 16, at 682-84.
191. See sources cited supra note 189; 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1982).
192. See, eg., Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (Under the Due
Process Clause, "adjudicatory action cannot be validly taken by any tribunal, whether judicial
or administrative, except upon a hearing."), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1949) (per curiam);
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This important distinction between legislative and adjudicative dis-
putes crystallized at the beginning of the century in Londoner v. Den-
ver 193 and Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado.194 A comparison of the two cases
reveals that the line between legislative and adjudicative disputes is diffi-
cult to draw. Even though both cases involved decisions by governmen-
tal bodies to increase property taxes, the Supreme Court recognized a
due process right to be heard in one case, but not the other.195
When a dispute is categorized as adjudicative-meaning that a right
to be heard exists and that a constitutionally protected interest is at
stake19 6-- the issue of what process is due arises. The Supreme Court
continues to view due process as "flexible," requiring "such procedural
protection as the particular situation demands." 197
The Supreme Court determines what process is due by applying a
see also 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.1 (1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA & NowAK].
193. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
194. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
195. In Bi-Metalic, the Court distinguished Londoner as follows:
In Londoner v. Denver,... a local board had to determine 'whether, in what amount,
and upon whom' a tax for paving a street should be levied for special benefits. A
relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected,
in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a
hearing. But that decision is far from reaching a general determination dealing only
with the principle upon which all the assessments in a county had been laid [as in Bi-
Metallic].
Id. at 445-46.
Professor Davis attempted to clarify the distinction by distinguishing between adjudica-
tive and legislative facts:
Facts pertaining to the parties and their businesses and activities, that is, adjudicative
facts, are... not to be determined without giving the parties a chance to know and to
meet any evidence that may be unfavorable to them, that is, without providing the
parties an opportunity for trial. The reason is that the parties know more about the
facts concerning themselves and their activities than anyone else is likely to know,
and the parties are therefore in an especially good position to rebut or explain evi-
dence that bears upon adjudicative facts. Yet people who are not necessarily parties,
frequently the agencies and their staffs, may often be the masters of legislative facts.
Because the parties may often have little or nothing to contribute to the development
of legislative facts, the method of trial often is not required for the determination of
disputed issues about legislative facts.
I K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1st ed. 1958). Professor Davis'
refinement has been criticized as "circular" and "elusive." Nathanson, Book Review, 70 YALE
L.J. 1210, 1211 (1961) (reviewing K. DAVIS, supra). For additional criticisms, see Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. RPv. 1267, 1268 (1975); Kestenbaum, Rulemaking
Beyond APA: Criteria for Trial-Type Procedures and the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 679, 691-93 (1976); Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another
Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 485, 521 (1970).
196. See infra note 286.
197. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 200 (1982) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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three-part balancing test. In Mathews v. Eldidge,198 the Court balanced
the private claimant's interest, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards," against the pertinent
governmental interest.199
This balancing test has been severely criticized.2"° Some scholars
argue that "one cannot accurately predict how any specific case will be
decided... unless one knows the personal value systems of those doing
the balancing." '' Others suggest that because the balancing test
"weighs an inevitable and immediately recognizable administrative cost
against a largely prophylactic interest in the use of specific procedural
protections.... it is likely that the Court's balancing test... will gener-
ally find in favor of the governmental interest."2 "2 Although alternatives
have been proposed,2"3 the Supreme Court has nevertheless remained
198. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Security recipient has no right to evidentiary hearing prior
to termination of disability benefits).
199. Id. at 335.
200. See, eg., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 241 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp.
1982) (Eldridge factors "do not include the kind of question to be determined"); ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 192, § 17.8, at 265; Marshaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CH. L. REv. 28, 30 (1976) ("[IThe failing of Eldridge is its focus on questions of
technique rather than on questions of value."); Redish & Marshall, supra note 124, at 473;
Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural
Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 154-56 (1978) (balancing "would inevitably dilute or elim-
inate dignitary protection").
201. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 192, § 17.8, at 265.
202. Redish & Marshall, supra note 124, at 473.
203. Justice Rehnquist has advocated a positivist approach to procedural due process, con-
cluding "that where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the'limita-
tions on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant... must
take the bitter with the sweet." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality
opinion), reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 559, (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This positivist approach has the benefit of
clarity and predictability: whatever procedure the legislature provides will satisfy due process.
This position has not yet been supported by a majority of the Supreme Court, and its constitu-
tional underpinnings have been extensively criticized. See, ag., Redish & Marshall, supra note
124, at 457-68.
A variety of proposals have been advanced by legal scholars. One recommends the adop-
tion of procedures designed to preserve core due process values. See id. at 474-505, stating that
"the purpose of the clause is to ensure the most accurate decision possible," id. at 476, and that
"most of the proposed values are inherently tied to the instrumental justification" of producing
an accurate decision, id. at 482. Redish and Marshall conclude that "the participation of an
independent adjudicator is ... an essential [due process] safeguard." Id. at 475. Another
commentator proposes implementation of management systems rather than new adversarial
procedures. See Marshaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Liti-
gation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. Rnv. 772 (1974). For a criticism of this proposal, see
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loyal to the Eldridge balancing test.
2°4
Moreover, the Supreme Court has failed in procedural due process
cases, as it has failed in nondelegation cases, 2" to distinguish consist-
ently between public and private delegations of power. For example, in a
case charging a state board of optometry with bias,2"6 the lower court
focused on the public-private relationship. The court concluded that the
optometry board's actions "would possibly redound to the personal bene-
fit" of the private practitioners serving on it.2°7 Based on this finding, the
Supreme Court held that the personal interests of the board members
were sufficient grounds for disqualification..208 In Schweiker v. Mc-
Clure,2"9 on the other hand, in which the use of private insurance carriers
to adjudicate claims under a governmental insurance plan was chal-
lenged, the Court barely acknowledged that Congress had delegated ad-
judicatory responsibilities to the private sector and not to a public
agency.210 The Court, however, did not give this fact any weight. In-
stead, the Court treated the private regulators as if they were public
ones." 1 The Court indulged a presumption that the private hearing of-
ficers were unbiased and held that the complaining party had the burden
of showing bias or deficient procedures.212
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, § 5.31, at 266-67. Yet another commentator favors the develop-
ment of several archetypes of fair procedures and their adaptation to particular situations. See
Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1044, 1144-49 (1984).
204. In 1985 alone, the members of the Supreme Court applied the Eldrige balancing test
in at least three cases. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-48 (1985)
(finding a cause of action for challenging adequacy of procedures for terminating school dis-
trict employees); Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 617-25 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring,
Brennan, J., joining) (upholding adequacy of procedures for revoking prisoner's probation);
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319-34 (1985) (upholding
constitutionality of limitation on fees for legal representation in service-related death or disa-
bility claims).
205. See supra notes 147-56, 180-84 and accompanying text.
206. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
207. Id. at 578. The District Court noted that optometrists in private practice accounted
for slightly more than half of all the optometrists in Alabama, but filled all the positions on the
Board of Optometry. Therefore, any decisions to suspend operations of businesses employing
optometrists would benefit members of the board and their colleagues in private practice. Id.;
see also Wall v. American Optometric Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (Board of
Examiners in Optometry, composed of only dispensing optometrists, deprived other optome-
trists of right to impartial tribunal), aff'd sub nom. Wall v. Hardwick, 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
208. Gibson, 411 U.S. at 579.
209. 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (describing statutory authority to use private insurance carriers
and specific procedures carriers must follow when resolving insurance claims).
210. Id. at 188.
211. Id. at 195 ("iihe hearing officers in this case serve in a quasi-judicial capacity, similar
in many respects to that of administrative law judges.").
212. Id. at 195-96, 200.
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The implications of McClure are extraordinary: as long as congres-
sional delegation does not violate the nondelegation of Article III judicial
power doctrine, Congress has the constitutional authority to delegate ju-
dicial power to private actors who need only comply with the same gen-
eral due process requirements as public actors. By treating public and
private actors similarly, this proposition ignores the crucial differences in
their public accountability,213 and therefore permits private actors to ex-
ercise judicial power subject to fewer safeguards than their public
counterparts.
C. State Action Doctrine
State action cases214 under the Due Process Clauses215 present the
only constitutional cases in which the Court is faced squarely with the
question whether a particular action is governmental or purely private.
21 6
This is a critical issue for private regulation: if the private regulator's
action is purely private, then for the most part the action is free from
constitutional restraints.21 7 If, on the other hand, the private regulator's
action is governmental in character, it is "state action," and is subject to
constitutional restrictions.21 8 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not
produced a coherent state action doctrine.219
213. See supra notes 80-123 and accompanying text; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, § 6.14,
at 312 (asking if McClure is "a return to non-AIJ or even non-APA hearing officers?").
214. The term "state action" is a misnomer. To be precise, "state action" applies only to
actions by a state that are subject to restraints under the Fourteenth Amendment, and "federal
action" applies to actions by the federal government that are subject to restraints under the
Fifth Amendment. The more general phrase "governmental action" encompasses both state
and federal action. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 192, at 157.
215. The Court makes an effort to accommodate the constitutional policies, including state
action doctrine, that are designed to protect the public against the risk of governmental tyr-
anny and to preserve for the private sector a zone of freedom. See, eg., Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
SrrUTIONAL LAW 1149 (1978 & Supp. 1979); Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern
State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 683, 723-24 (1984).
216. As discussed above, the Court has either not recognized, or given erratic attention to,
the private character of the actors when it has applied the nondelegation of lawmaking doc-
trine, the nondelegation of Article III judicial power doctrine, and procedural due process.
See supra notes 147-56, 180-84, 206-13 and accompanying text.
217. Only the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery, applies to private action.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 192, at 156-57.
218. As recently restated by the Supreme Court, "Embedded in our Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the
Amendments Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment af-
fords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be." NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct.
454, 461 (1988).
219. The doctrine has been called a "conceptual disaster area," Black, The Supreme Court,
1966 Term - Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
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A recent line of creditor-debtor cases illustrates the doctrinal confu-
sion.220 The core facts in all but one22 of these cases are similar: the
creditors were private actors who adjudicated disputes. In each case, a
private creditor decided unilaterally that money was owed and took gov-
ernment-like action to collect the debt with only nominal judicial
- 222supervision.
In the first four cases, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,223 Fuentes
v. Shevin,224 Mitchell v. W. T Grant Co.,225 and North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,226 the Supreme Court never discussed whether the
private creditors debt-collection procedures constituted state action, but
the Court implicitly found state action in each case when it considered
HARV. L. Rnv. 69, 95 (1967); Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra - Fourteen Years
Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289, 1290 (1982), "inevitabl[y] incoheren[t]," Phillips, supra note
215, at 683, and easily manipulated "to protect the autonomy of business enterprises against
the claims of consumers, minorities, and other relatively powerless citizens," Brest, State Ac-
tion and Liberal Theory: A Case Note On Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. Rnv.
1296, 1330 (1982). Judge Friendly concluded that "[i]f we now know more about the location
of the border between public and private action, this is rather because the Court has pricked
out more reference points than because it has elaborated any satisfying theory." Friendly,
supra, at 1291. And even the Supreme Court has stated that it is an "impossible task" to
"fashion and apply a precise formula" for determining the presence of state action. Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
220. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149;
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
221. In Mitchell, 416 U.S. 600, the private creditor applied exparte to a judge, as opposed
to a court clerk, for a writ of sequestration under a state statute. The judge issued the writ
based on a clear and detailed evidentiary showing that grounds for issuing the writ existed. Id
at 601-07. Cf infra note 222.
222. In Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337, the lawyer of the private creditor initiated prejudgment
garnishment of machinery under a state statute. In an ex parte application, he requested the
clerk of the court to issue a summons and then served the garnishee, who froze a portion of the
debtor's wages. Id. at 338-39. In Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67, the private creditor applied exparte to
a court clerk for a prejudgment.writ of replevin under a state statute. The clerk issued the writ
based on the creditor's bare assertion that the creditor was entitled to the writ. IdL at 69-78.
In North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. 601, a private creditor applied ex parte to a court clerk
for a prejudgment garnishment under a state statute. The clerk issued the writ based on a
conclusory affidavit of the creditor that the creditor was entitled to it. Idk at 601-07. In F/agg
Bros., 436 U.S. 149, before obtaining a money judgment or even a temporary ex parte order,
the private creditor-a warehouse owner-decided to sell stored goods to satisfy moving and
storage fees allegedly owed him by the property owner. Id at 151-55. In Lugar, 457 U.S. 922,
the private creditor applied ex parte to a court clerk for a prejudgment writ of attachment
under a state statute. The clerk issued the writ based on the allegation that the debtor was, or
might be, disposing of property in order to defeat his creditors. Id at 924-25.
223. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
224. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
225. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
226. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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the issue whether the due process rights of the debtors had been vio-
lated.227 In contrast, the Court in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks228 and Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co. 229 specifically addressed the state action issue and, in
so doing, tried to reconcile the four earlier creditor-debtor cases. The
results in these two cases illustrate the Court's difficulty in applying state
action doctrine.23°
The Supreme Court has so narrowed the public function component
of the state action doctrine as to render it almost meaningless. 231 The
Court now recognizes state action in private activities only when they are
traditionally and "exclusively" governmental.232 Since it began applying
this "public function" test, the Court has not found state action.233 The
Court's conceptual uncertainty with this test was illustrated in Flagg
Bros., in which the Court held that "the settlement of disputes between
debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public function. '2 34
In this narrow and controversial application of the public function doe-
227. In Sniadach, Fuentes, and North Georgia Finishing, the Court found due process
violations.
228. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
229. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
230. In Flagg Bros., the majority simply concluded that, "This total absence of overt offi-
cial involvement plainly distinguishes this case from earlier decisions imposing procedural re-
strictions on creditors' remedies." 436 U.S. at 157. The dissent disagreed vigorously. Justice
Stevens claimed that the majority's view-that the case involved only a private deprivation of
property-"is fundamentally inconsistent with, if not foreclosed by, our prior decisions which
have imposed procedural restrictions on the State's authorization of certain creditors' reme-
dies." Id at 169 (Stevens, J., dissenting, White, J., and Marshall, J., joining).
The Lugar majority opinion stated that:
Beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.... the Court has consistently
held that constitutional requirements of due process apply to garnishment and pre-
judgment attachment procedures whenever officers of the State act jointly with a
creditor in securing the property in dispute.... [P]rivate use of the challenged state
procedures with the help of state officials constitutes state action.
457 U.S. at 932-33. The dissent viewed the precedent differently. Justice Powell noted that
"[n]one of the cases alleged that the private creditor was a joint actor with the State...." Id
at 952 (Powell, J., dissenting, Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J., joining).
231. For a description of the history and evolution of the public function doctrine, see
ROTuNDA & NOWAK, supra note 192, at § 16.2; M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 5.11 (1986).
232. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (provision of electri-
cal service by private utility operating under government franchise is not a public function); see
also Phillips, supra note 215, at 705.
233. San Francisco Arts & Athietics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct.
2971 (1987) (coordination of amateur sports); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (provi-
sion of nursing home care); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (special education for
children); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (settlement of disputes); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (operation of shopping mall).
234. F/agg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161-62.
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trine,2 3 5 the majority undermined their clear holding not only by failing
to adhere to its view of the exclusivity test,23 6 but also by leaving open
the possibility that other forms of dispute settlement might constitute a
public function.237
The Supreme Court's state action theory is easily manipulated. For
example, when applying the "government regulation" test,238 the Court
has used the following formula:
The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not
by itself convert its action into that of the State.... [T]he inquiry
must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.2 39
A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in four of the five
most recent cases24° demonstrates how easy it is to manipulate this judi-
cial approach: each case finds majority and dissent applying the same
test for state action and arriving at opposite results.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,24 the Court found that a
235. In Flagg Bros., Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed with this application of the exclu-
sivity test. He concluded that "[w]hether termed 'traditional,' 'exclusive,' or 'significant,' the
state power to order binding, nonconsensual resolution of a conflict between debtor and credi-
tor is exactly the sort of power with which the Due Process Clause is concerned." Id. at 176.
236. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, pointed out that, "As the Court is forced to recognize,
its notion of exclusivity simply cannot be squared with the wide range of functions that are
typically considered sovereign functions, such as education, fire and police protection, and tax
collection." Id. at 173 n.10.
237. The majority stated, "This is not to say that dispute resolution between creditors and
debtors involves a category of human affairs that is never subject to these constitutional con-
straints. We merely address the public-function doctrine as respondents would apply it to this
case." Id. at 162 n.12. For a discussion of the majority's application of the public function
doctrine see id. at 172 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Under the government regulation test, the Court determines whether the government
regulates the challenged private action so extensively that the action constitutes state action.
See, eg., Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461-63 (1952) (government regulation
of bus company was sufficient to constitute government action). The test, however, was lim-
ited in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972) (government regulation of
liquor license did not implicate discriminatory policies of private club enough to constitute
state action), and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-59 (1974) (insuffi-
ciently close nexus between state and challenged action of regulated entity).
239. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51 (citing Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176-77 (1972)); see also
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2984-
86 (1987); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
841 (1982).
240. The fifth case is San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987). Holding that
the U.S. Olympic Committee was not a governmental actor, the majority said "[e]ven exten-
sive regulation by the government does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into
those of the government." Id at 2985. Neither of the dissenting opinions addressed this issue.
241. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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utility company's termination of service was not state action, even
though the utility was extensively regulated, because the state did not
"put its own weight on the side of the" utility's procedures for terminat-
ing electrical service.' Justice Marshall, dissenting, found that the
State had in fact approved the private utility's termination procedures. 243
In Blum v. Yaretsky,z4 the Court found that decisions by private
physicians and nursing home administrators were not state action, de-
spite extensive state regulation of the nursing home, because the deci-
sions to discharge or transfer patients "ultimately turn[ed] on medical
judgments made by private parties according to professional standards
that [were] not established by the State.""24 Justice Brennan, however, in
his dissent, concluded that "[t]he State has set forth precisely the stan-
dards upon which the level-of-care determinations are to be made, and
has delegated administration of the program to [private] nursing home
operators."1
246
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,247 the Court found that a private school's
decisions were not state action despite extensive regulation of the school
because the "regulators showed relatively little interest in the school's
personnel matters" that led to the termination of the teachers and a voca-
tional counselor.24 In his dissent, Justice Marshall concluded that the
private school was subject to a variety of regulations covering "almost
every aspect of a private school's operations, including . . . personnel
policies."' 49
Finally, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,250 the Court found that the
guest policies of a private club were not state action even though the club
was extensively regulated in connection with its liquor license, because
the regulations played "absolutely no part in establishing or enforcing
[private] guest policies" that barred serving blacks.251 In his dissent, Jus-
tice Brennan found the State's "liquor regulations intertwine[d] the State
with the operation of the Lodge bar in a 'significant way [and lent the
State's] authority to the sordid business of racial discrimination.' "252
242. Id at 357.
243. Id. at 370 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
244. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
245. Id. at 1008.
246. Id at 1026-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting, Marshall, J., joining).
247. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
248. Id at 841.
249. Id at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting, Brennan, J., joining).
250. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
251. Id. at 175.
252. Id at 186 (Brennan, J., dissenting, Marshall, J., joining).
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a
Unlike nondelegation and procedural due process cases, state action
cases specifically consider the private character of the actors. In particu-
lar, the Court has had to examine public-private relationships in order to
determine whether particular actions constitute state action. Unfortu-
nately, the Court has not produced a coherent doctrine when it finally
directly confronted the application of the Constitution to private
actions.253
D. Nondelegation Doctrine and Due Process: Commingling of Concepts
When it has examined the constitutionality of private regulation, the
Supreme Court has not maintained a clear distinction between the
nondelegation of legislative power doctrine and the Due Process Clause.
Instead, the Court has commingled the two concepts and, as a result, has
produced some murky rationales for its decisions.
The most glaring example of this commingling is found in Carter
Coal.254 Striking down a congressional delegation of lawmaking to the
private sector, the Court inexplicably relied on the Due Process
Clause.255 A series of early state zoning cases in which the Supreme
Court used the Due Process Clause as a vehicle for applying the nondele-
gation principle to state enactments also serve as examples of the Court's
commingling.
256
253. Professor Tribe recently revised his earlier description of the state action doctrine as
"inevitably bankrupt." L. TRIBE, supra note 215, at 1149-57 (1978). He now concludes "that
the Supreme Court's state action cases display a surprisingly coherent pattern once one gets
past their often neuralgic prose and views the cases through a suitably sequenced combination
of two different lenses." L. TRIBE, CONSTrUTIONAL CHOIcES 248 (1985). Professor Tribe
suggests first using a "close-up lens" to focus on the actual participants-the "state actors,"
and then using a "telephoto lens... to examine the substantive law that provides the picture's
background." Id. In contrast, Professor Phillips attempts "to demonstrate that the incoher-
ence of modern state action law is virtually inevitable" due to public-private blurring caused by
the rise to power of large institutionalized private groups, an activist government, and the
"corporate state," and by a growing concern for the protection of individual rights. Phillips,
supra note 215, at 721-38.
254. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
255. The Court held, "This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form.... The
delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to deci-
sions of this court which foreclose the question." Id. at 311-12 (citing Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1934); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912);
Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-122 (1928)). But see Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 855 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that Schecter was.based on Article I
grant of legislative power rather than the Due Process Clause).
256. Seattle Trust Co., 278 U.S. at 121-23 (1928) (delegation of power to landowners was
unconstitutional under Due Process Clause because statute lacked standards to restrain deci-
sion making of landowners, omitted any provision for review, and did not bind private land-
owners to any official duty); see also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96,
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This commingling of concepts has also occurred in some of the cred-
itor-debtor cases. In Fuentes, for example, the Court implicated the
nondelegation principle when it found a state statute violated due process
because it gave private parties the authority to "unilaterally invoke state
power to replevy goods from another. '2 7 In Flagg Bros., Justice Stevens
noted in dissent that he would have applied the Due Process Clause to a
state statute which, he said, delegated the power to resolve disputes to a
private party.
258
This commingling of the nondelegation doctrine and the Due Pro-
cess Clause is a persistent practice.259 Some commingling is probably the
result of sloppy judicial analysis, and some is probably deliberate-to jus-
tify applying the federal Constitution to state statutes. Regardless of its
cause, the mixing of concepts has produced muddied judicial rationales.
Commentators have even suggested that courts should replace the
nondelegation doctrine with the Due Process Clause.2" Until the
Supreme Court articulates a consistent approach, the commingling of
nondelegation and due process concepts is likely to continue.
114-27 (1978) (Stevens, I., dissenting) (Stevens would have held delegation of power to tempo-
rarily prohibit opening of new car dealership an "unconstitutional exercise of uncontrolled
government power" under Due Process Clause, relying in part on Carter Coal); City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enters, 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S.
526 (1917). Of course, the Court could not have used the federal nondelegation doctrine in
these cases because the doctrine does not apply to state delegations of lawmaking.
257. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972).
258. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 176 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting, White, J., and
Marshall, J., joining) ("IT]he state power to order binding, nonconsensual resolution of a con-
flict ... is exactly the sort of power with which the Due Process Clause is concerned. And the
State's delegation of that power to a private party is, accordingly, subject to due process
scrutiny.").
259. In 1938, the nondelegation of legislative power doctrine was thought to be "just as
easily and logically available under the Due Process Clause." Cushman, The Constitutional
Status of the Independant Regulatory Commissions, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 13, 33 (1938). And in
1975, 37 years later, essentially the same observation was made: "several recent cases decided
on 'state action' grounds might just as easily have relied on the delegation doctrine. If certain
conduct may be labeled 'state action' for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, there is often
equal room for nondelegation to operate." Liebmann, supra note 21, at 653-54; see also Note,
supra note 146, at 262 n.24 (concluding that "[n]ondelegation review is often associated with
the constitutional guarantee of due process").
260. In Professor Jaffe's classic 1937 article, he suggested that it might be desirable to drop
delegation as a constitutional category and instead "regard the question simply as one of rea-
sonableness within the due process clause." Jaffe, supra note 21, at 248. Professor Lawrence,
in the most recent article on the subject, rejected the use of the state version of nondelegation
doctrine and recommended that state courts evaluate the exercise of private governmental
power under their state due process provisions. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 662, 672-75, 694-
95. See also Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups, 67
HARv. L. REv. 1398, 1408 (1954) (recommending that rule against delegation be regarded as
extension of due process).
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While failing to consistently recognize the differences between pub-
lic and private delegations, 261 the Supreme Court has produced incoher-
ent doctrines on federal nondelegation of lawmaking, federal
nondelegation of Article III judicial power, due process, and state action
when private regulators are involved. The next section proposes an anal-
ysis that integrates these four areas of constitutional law and addresses
their interrelationships. This analysis should promote a systematic and
coherent constitutional evaluation of the activities of private regulators.
IV. Promoting a Constitutionally Coherent Analysis of
Activities of Private Regulators
A. A Systematic Five-Step Inquiry
Although the Court's application of the four constitutional doc-
trines just examined contributes to the confusion about the constitutional
status of private regulatory activity, the four doctrines also provide the
basis for a more coherent judicial approach. Using the following analysis
will not eliminate all of the confusion, but it will narrow the issues by
integrating the four key areas of constitutional law into a systematic five-
step inquiry that highlights private involvement in the exercise of govern-
mental powers. A court analyzing a private regulatory action should
consider the following questions:
(1) Does the case involve a private actor?
(2) Does the private actor make laws and/or adjudicate disputes?
(3) Is there an unconstitutional delegation of federal lawmaking or Arti-
cle III judicial power?
(4) Does the action by the private regulator constitute state action?
(5) Does the state action comply with due process?
1. Does the Case Involve a Private Actor?
At the outset, a court should determine whether a case involves a
private actor. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has failed fre-
quently to consider this threshold question in nondelegation and proce-
dural due process cases.262 In some cases, the Court has applied the
same constitutional analysis to private actors that it applies to public
actors.263 The Court's approach overlooks that private actors are not
accountable to the public to the same extent as public actors. Private
actors enjoy a "zone of freedom" under the Constitution to do things the
261. See supra notes 125-260 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 147-56, 180-84, 205-13 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text; infra notes 300-07 and accompanying
text.
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government cannot,26 and they are exempt from many of the obligations
and restrictions that apply to public actors.265 Therefore, it is important
to recognize at the outset whether a private actor is involved.. If there is
no private actor, this inquiry ends and the Court can proceed with its
standard analysis of government actions. If a private actor is involved,266
however, this threshold fact indicates the need to proceed to the next step
of this inquiry.
2. Does the Private Actor Make Laws and/or Adjudicate Disputes?
The next step is to determine whether the private actor is exercising
core governmental powers. 267 If the private actor is not making laws
268
or adjudicating disputes,269 there is no constitutional issue and this anal-
ysis is concluded. But the finding that a private actor is exercising gov-
ernmental type power does not, in itself, violate the Constitution. Such a
finding merely places the constitutional inquiry into the context of pri-
vate regulatory activity.
3. Is There an Unconstitutional Delegation of Federal Lawmaking or
Article III Judicial Power?
Neither of the two nondelegation doctrines has been interpreted so
strictly as to bar all delegations. A strict interpretation would simplify
the application of the nondelegation doctrines, but the Court has recog-
nized that Congress needs flexibility to effect innovative legislative
schemes. 270 Thus, the Court has upheld a broad range of delegations,
putting forward various theories for distinguishing between permissible
264. See supra notes 83-87, 216-17 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 80-123 and accompanying text.
266. Usually it is easy to determine whether a case involves a private actor. One interesting
exception occurred in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), in which the issue was
whether Indian tribes were private actors. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's
conclusion that Congress' delegation of authority to tribal officials was invalid because the
tribe was a private organization. The Supreme Court held that the Indian tribes were not just
private organizations, they were "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty."
Id. at 556-57.
267. See supra notes 12-16, 54-61 and accompanying text. This Article examines only the
lawmaking and adjudicative powers.
268. See, eg., Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 388-99 (1940) (private coal
producers did not make laws but only made proposals to National Bituminous Coal Commis-
sion, which had authority to approve, disapprove, or modify proposals).
269. See, eg., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 108-09 (1978)
(protesting dealers were not adjudicating disputes or exercising judicial power when their pro-
tests temporarily enjoined the establishment of new dealerships); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) (private creditor was not adjudicating dispute but only making ex
parte showing to judge who made the decision).
270. See supra notes 125-84 and accompanying text.
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and impermissible delegations of lawmaking271 and judicial power.2 72
Theories of nondelegation of lawmaking have in common a defini-
tion of lawmaking that obligates Congress to make "important choices of
social policy" and to provide the delegate "with an 'intelligible principle'
to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion. ' 273 Theories of nondele-
gation of judicial power have in common a conception that judicial
power must be exercised by Article III judges.274 Any private delegation
that oversteps these narrow definitions of lawmaking275 and judicial
power 2 7 6 is unconstitutional; such a conclusion ends this analysis. That
does'not mean, however, that all other delegations of lawmaking and
judicial power are constitutional. The private delegation might still con-
stitute state action, and if it does, it must comply with due process.
4. Does the Action By the Private Regulator Constitute State Action?
This question confronts directly the distinction between purely pri-
vate conduct and private conduct that constitutes state action. State ac-
tions are subject to constitutional restrictions.
277
A court's finding that a private action (step one) resembles lawmak-
ing or adjudication (step two) does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the action constitutes state action.278 The three categories of public-
271. Theories include the "contingency" theory, "filling up the details" theory, and the
"intelligible principle" theory. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
272. Theories include the "inherently judicial" power test, the "adjunct" test, and the
"public right-private right" test. See supra notes 164-79 and accompanying text.
273. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 57, at §§ 2.1-2.2. But see 1 K.
DAVIS, supra note 124, at §§ 3:1-3:7 (Supreme Court has upheld many delegations that lack
standard or "intelligible principle").
274. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(attempting to clarify definition of Article III judicial power by reducing precedent to three
situations in which Article III restrictions do not apply).
275. See, eg., Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 672, 687. Justice Rehnquist concurred in
this public agency case, stating that Congress had improperly delegated its lawmaking respon-
sibility for deciding "whether the statistical possibility of future deaths should ever be disre-
garded in light of the economic costs of preventing those deaths." He felt this was a critical
policy decision that Congress must make.
276. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)
(Court held delegation to private arbitrators did not violate Article III); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 50 (plurality in public agency case, holding delegation of judicial
power to non-Article III bankruptcy courts violated Article III).
277. For an explanation of the difference between state and federal action cases, see supra
note 214.
278. The Court did not find state action in Moose Lodge, even though it recognized that the
Supreme Lodge had adopted a bylaw that barred non-Caucasian guests from visiting local
Moose Lodges. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166, 176, 179 (1972). Nor did
the Court find state action in Flagg Bros., even though it recognized that private enforcement
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private relationships set forth in this Article279 could guide a judicial ap-
proach to the state action question.
The most complex state action analysis arises in the context of dele-
gation to Category B actors. This category encompasses a wide range of
public-private relationships, 280 which are subject to review under the
public function test2"1 and the various governmental contact tests.282
But merely identifying a case as one that falls within Category B does not
simplify the state action analysis; the tests must still be understood and
applied anew to each public-private relationship. The real benefit of cate-
gorizing cases lies in identifying the easier cases for state action analy-
sis-the non-Category B cases.
Category A represents the easiest set of cases for finding state action.
In these cases, the government has formally deputized a private actor.
Since, by definition, the private actor has been made a public actor, its
action will constitute state action.28 3
Category C encompasses the cases least likely to involve state ac-
tion. Here, government has no formal connection with the activities of
of a warehouse owner's lien meant the warehouse owner was resolving disputes between pri-
vate parties. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1978); see also Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991 (1982) (decisions of private nursing homes to discharge or transfer Medicaid
patients did not constitute state action); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private
school decisions to discharge employees did not constitute state action).
279. See supra notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
282. The various governmental contact tests, including the government regulation test, see
supra notes 238-52 and accompanying text, encompass a group of state action tests that focus
on the relationship between governement and the private actor. The inquiry may be cast in
different ways. Has the state provided sufficient encouragement or command to the private
action to constitute state action? See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). But cf
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978) (in sufficient state encouragement when
there is mere denial of judicial relief or when statute "permits but does not compel" private
sale). Does the government have a symbiotic relationship with the private actor? See, eg.,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth. 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Is government providing suffi-
cient direct aid to the challenged private action? See, ag., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,
417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). But cf San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) (USOC did not
become state actor when Congress helped it obtain funding); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982) (substantial state funding of private nursing homes did not make them state actors);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) ("Acts of... private contractors [schools]
do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement
in performing public contracts"). See generally, ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 192, at
§ 16.4.
283. See, eg., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (state board of optometry, com-
posed of private optometrists, must comply with due process); see also supra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text.
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the private regulator.284 But when they perform government-like func-
tions, private regulators are subject to review under the limited public
function test of the state action doctrine.285
If a private actor can fairly be characterized as a private regulator
whose actions constitute state action, the last step in the analysis is to
determine whether the actions comply with due process.
5. Does the State Action Comply with Due Process?
Even if the private actor (step one) makes laws or adjudicates dis-
putes (step two) pursuant to a delegation that does not violate the
nondelegation doctrines (step three), and the activities constitute state
action (step four), the private regulator is not yet beyond constitutional
scrutiny. Assuming that a constitutionally protected interest is at
stake,286 the private regulator must comply with due process. Although
private regulation is also limited by substantive due process, 287 a proce-
284. But if their activities are government funded, this may be enough of a governmental
connection to convert the funded activities into Category B activities. If so, the private action
would be analyzed under the governmental regulation tests, see supra note 238.
285. As the public function doctrine has been substantially narrowed, it probably does not
present a practical constitutional threat to private activities. See supra notes 231-33 and ac-
companying text. This is especially true after Flagg Bros., in which the Court held that private
settlement of disputes is not an exclusive public function. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
161 (1978). Nonetheless, a narrow view of the doctrine still presents a theoretical threat. Even
in Flagg Broa, the Court qualified its holding by emphasizing that "[t]his is not to say that
dispute resolution between creditors and debtors involves a category of human affairs that is
never subject to constitutional constraints." Id. at 162 n.12. Furthermore, the Court has
found state action in older public function cases even though no formal delegation to the pri-
vate actor took place. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private park operated with
racial restriction), remand, 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953) (pre-primary elections by private political clubs), reh'g denied, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (privately owned town performed normal functions of
a city); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (establishment of white primary system by
state political party convention).
286. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect life, lib-
erty, and property. One of these constitutionally protected interests must be adversely affected
by a private regulator in order for the Due Process Clauses to apply. Since Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Supreme Court has interpreted these three discrete interests
literally and restrictively, see ROTUNDA & NowAx, supra note 192, at 205-06, and "[n]o satis-
factory unifying principle for determining what interests are or are not protected by due pro-
cess have been developed." 2 K. DAvis, supra note 54, at § 11:1; see also Rubin, supra note
203, at 1047.
In a private regulation case, this issue might arise in a claim that a private actor injured a
claimant's personal reputation, an interest that the Supreme Court has not yet recognized as a
constitutionally protected interest under the Due Process Clauses, see ROTUNDA & NOWAK,
supra note 192, at 230-32, 244-45.
287. Under substantive due process, a court will overturn legislation only if the law has no
rational relationship to a legitimate goal of government. See, eg., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). Or, if a law limits a "fundamental right," it must
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dural due process claim is more likely to arise.2 88 Therefore, procedural
due process is the focus of the fifth and final step of this constitutional
inquiry.
Procedural due process applies not only to public adjudicatory ac-
tions,28 9 but also to private adjudicatory actions that amount to govern-
mental action.290 Procedural due process does not, however, usually
apply to strictly lawmaking activities.291 The issue whether an activity is
legislative or judicial has been decisive in determining whether proce-
dural due process restrictions apply to the actions of private regula-
tors.292 Unfortunately, the line between lawmaking and adjudication is
not always clear.293
promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest. See, eg., United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1941). See generally ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note
192, at §§ 14.6, 15.4, 15.5-.7.
The Equal Protection Clause also applies to state action under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and has been interpreted to apply to federal action under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. An analysis of classifications under the Equal Protection Clause is similar
to the analysis undertaken under substantive due process. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 192, at § 14.7.
288. This is so because substantive. due process imposes only limited constitutional re-
straints. The Court will uphold any law for which conceivable justification can be made so
long as no fundamental right is implicated. If a fundamental right is at stake, however, the
Court will subject the justification to "strict scrutiny." See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
192, at §§ 14.6, 15.4-.7.
289. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
290. In Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982), the Supreme Court applied the Due
Process Clause to a federal program that delegated to private insurance carriers the full and
final authority to adjudicate claims for federal health insurance benefits. Id. at 189-91.
Neither the statute nor the agency's regulations provided for governmental review of the deci-
sions. The Court rejected the claims that the private hearing officers were not impartial and
that due process required the use of additional procedures in order to reduce the risk of error.
I. at 195-200. And, in a series of state creditor-debtor cases, the Supreme Court applied the
Due Process Clause to actions of private creditors, who were in effect adjudicating creditor-
debtor disputes. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
293. In a series of zoning cases, the power to regulate the use of private property was given
to private citizens. When the private citizens' group was the general electorate, the Supreme
Court viewed the decision-making power as legislative and therefore held that due process did
not apply. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). The Court held that
the requirement that zoning changes be approved by public referendum meant only that the
people had reserved to themselves the power to legislate. Id at 675. In his dissent, Justice
Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan joined, viewed the decision to amend the zoning code as
adjudicative and concluded that the use of a popular vote did not comport with the procedure
required by due process. Id at 680-94.
However, when the delegated private citizens were neighboring property owners, the deci-
sion-making power was held to.be adjudicative and therefore had to comply with due process.
Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). The Court held that the authority of neighboring
private landowners to impose a building line was invalid under the Due Process Clause be-
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If procedural due process does apply, the decision-making process
must comport with constitutional standards. The Supreme Court usually
determines this by employing the three-part Eldridge balancing test.
294
This Article contends that the Court's constitutional analysis should ac-
count for the crucial fact that private actors are subject to less public
accountability than public actors.2 95 This distinction should be part of a
due process analysis (step five), rather than a nondelegation analysis (step
three), because the Due Process Clause has the tradition and precedent
necessary to confront the constitutional implications of private sector in-
volvement in governmental-type decision making.2 96
B. Benefits Achieved From the Five-Step Inquiry
At least three benefits can be realized by using this approach for
evaluating the constitutionality of the activities of private regulators.
This Section also suggests how the inquiry might work in practice.
(1) The first and foremost advantage of this five-step inquiry is that
it brings to the forefront of constitutional analysis the crucial fact that
the private sector is involved in the exercise of governmental powers. As
discussed above in detail, the Court has ignored private sector involve-
ment in some cases and has recognized but failed to analyze its implica-
tions in other cases.29 7 If the Court had explicitly focused on the
involvement of the private sector, as the first two parts of this inquiry
require, then it might not have upheld some of these private delegations.
In McClure,29 if the Court had focused on the private characteristics of
the insurance carriers,2 99 it might have found their adjudicatory activities
constitutionally deficient under the Due Process Clause because private
actors are less accountable than public ones.
cause the local ordinance did not establish any standards to limit the exercise of the power. Id
at 143-45. In Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), the Court held that the
authority of neighboring private landowners to approve the use of land for a philanthropic
home for children or for old people was invalid under the Due Process Clause because the
landowners were not required to conform to any standards, were not bound by any official
duty, and their actions were not subject to review. Id. at 121-22. The majority in Eastlake
distinguished these two earlier cases by concluding that "the standardless delegation of power
to a limited group of property owners condemned by the Court in Eubank and Roberge is not
to be equated with decisionmaking by the people through the referendum process." City of
Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 678.
294. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 209-13 and ac-
companying text.
295. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
296. See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 659-62, 682-94; see also supra note 260.
297. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
298. See supra notes 147-56, 180-84, 205-13 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
Winter 1989] PRIVATE REGULATORS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY 217
(2) This five-part inquiry not only highlights private sector involve-
ment in governmental decision making, but it also helps clarify the un-
derlying complex public-private relationship. It does this by explicitly
separating the nondelegation (step three), state action (step four), and
due process (step five) analyses. The danger of collapsing these three
steps into one is illustrated by the Curin"00 and Rock Royal Co-op. 301
cases.
In Currin, the Court relied on administrative agency cases,30 2 and
thus failed to appreciate that the delegation gave the private growers of
tobacco the power to make binding the Secretary of Agriculture's
designation of tobacco markets30 a In Rock Royal Co-op., private produ-
cers of milk had the final say on the effectiveness of certain agricultural
marketing orders proposed by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Presi-
dent.3° The Court did not recognize that these conditions gave the pri-
vate parties the power to act jointly with the Secretary of Agriculture,305
and that their power to "fill in the details ' 306 mounted to veto power
over governmental action. Moreover, by using the administrative agency
cases to evaluate both the public and private actions, the Court failed to
focus on the crucial difference between participation by a public official
and participation by the private sector. The Court treated both actors
similarly, and having upheld the public delegation, probably felt obliged
to uphold the private delegation.
30 7
On the other hand, if the Court had recognized that separate inquir-
ies under nondelegation doctrine (step three), state action doctrine (step
four), and the Due Process Clause (step five) were warranted, it might
have concluded that the involvement of the public official was constitu-
tional but the involvement of the private actor was not. Under this pro-
posed five-step inquiry, the Court might have recognized private sector
involvement in lawmaking (steps one and two), concluded that this type
of lawmaking did not violate the nondelegation doctrine (step three), and
held that the veto power constituted state action (step four). Then, by
pursuing a separate due process inquiry (step five), the Court would have
focused specifically on whether the private growers had any conflicts of
300. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
301. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
302. 306 U.S. at 15-16. In Rock Royal Co-op., the Supreme Court simply relied on Currin,
307 U.S. at 577-78. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
303. Currin, 306 U.S. at 5-6.
304. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. at 542-48.
305. 306 U.S. at 15-16; see also 307 U.S. at 577-78.
306. 306 U.S. at 15.
307. 306 U.S. at 16-18; see also 307 U.S. at 574-77.
218 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 16:165
interest that would make their involvement in governmental decision
making unconstitutional.
(3) Finally, this type of inquiry highlights the interrelationships
among the key constitutional doctrines and helps clarify which constitu-
tional issues should be examined. This endeavor is facilitated by use of
the three categories of public-private relationships.
If a private regulator fits into either Category A30 8 (governmental
deputy) or Category CIO9 (purely private), the public-private issues are
less complex and the five-step inquiry may proceed on a fast track. If the
private actor falls within Category A, because there is a formal state
deputization of the private actor, the federal nondelegation doctrines
(step three) will not apply, and state action (step four) is obvious. The
constitutional issue will usually be limited to whether the action complies
with due process (step five). This is what happened in Gibson v. Berry-
hill3"' when the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of an ac-
tion by the Alabama Board of Optometry, which was composed "solely
of optometrists in private practice"3 ' (steps one and two). Article III
did not apply because the case involved state rather than federal judicial
power, (step three) and state action by a state board was obvious (step
four). Therefore, the narrow constitutional issue was whether the
Board's action violated due process (step five).3" 2
If a private actor appears to fall within Category C because there is
no formal connection between government and the private actor, the
nondelegation doctrines (step three) are unlikely to apply, and the consti-
tutional issue will usually be confined to whether the private action con-
stitutes state action (step four). Because the public function test for state
action has been so narrowly construed, 1 3 the due process issue (step 5)
will probably not be reached.
However, if a private actor falls within Category A and involves a
federal delegation, or falls within Category B,3" 4 the public-private rela-
tionship will be more complex. Multiple constitutional issues will be in-
volved and a full five-part analysis will usually be warranted.31 5
308. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
310. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
311. 411 U.S. at 578 (1973).
312. The Court found that the personal interests of the members of the board disqualified
them from adjudicating the dispute. It. at 578-79.
313. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
315. For a Category B case involving state delegation, only four of the five parts of the
inquiry need be pursued. Step three on the federal nondelegation doctrines can be omitted
Winter 1989] PRIVATE REGULATORS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY 219
This five-step inquiry also would eliminate the confusion generated
by commingling nondelegation doctrine and due process concepts.316
The Carter Coal case provides an unusally clear example of the confusion
that could be eliminated. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized the
involvement of the private producers and miners (step one) in the making
of laws to fix maximum hours and minimum wages (step two). But the
Court mixed up nondelegation doctrine (step three) with the Due Process
Clause (step five) by analyzing the issue in terms of delegation but decid-
ing the case under the Due Process Clause.317 This confusion could have
been avoided if the Court had separated the nondelegation inquiry (step
three) from the due process inquiry (step five).
This five-part analysis was employed, although imperfectly3" 8 and
incompletely, 31 9 in Union Carbide.320 There, the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a congressional delegation to private adjudicators.
The Court recognized that arbitrators appointed by the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service (step one)321 were authorized to adjudicate
disputes between private pesticide firms (step two), 322 and that the dele-
gation did not violate the nondelegation of Article III judicial power doc-
trine (step three)323. The Court also found that the delegation pursuant
to a federal statute constituted governmental action (step four)324 and
complied with due process (step five).325
Conclusion
In conclusion, it must be emphasized that this five-step inquiry will
not cure all the problems associated with the application of the nondele-
because the step does not apply to state delegations. But a four-step inquiry should still clarify
the remaining constitutional issues that need to be examined.
316. See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
317. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936); see also supra notes 254-55
and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
319. See infra notes 324-25.
320. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
321. Id at 572-75, 590-91.
322. Id. at 571-75.
323. Id. at 593-94.
324. The Court did not specifically examine whether or not governmental action existed,
presumably because it thought state action was obvious. However, the Court implicitly found
governmental action when it reached the due process issue. See infra note 325 and accompa-
nying text.
325. While the Court found that the federal statute did "not obstruct whatever [Article III]
judicial review might be required by due process," it did "not identify the extent to which due
process may require review of determinations by the arbitrator" because the parties had
dropped the due process claims. 473 U.S. at 592-93.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
gation doctrines, the Due Process Clause, and state action doctrine.3 26
The benefits of this analysis are that it highlights private sector involve-
ment, exposes the underlying public-private relationship, reduces the
commingling of constitutional concepts, and recognizes the interrelation-
ships among key constitutional doctrines. As a result, the proposed sys-
tematic inquiry should contribute to the development of a more coherent
constitutional analysis of the activities of the Fifth Branch of private
regulators.
326. See supra notes 124-261 and accompanying text.
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